James Blair Historical Review, Volume 5 by unknown
James Blair Historical Review 
Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 1 
2014 
James Blair Historical Review, Volume 5 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr 
 Part of the History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
(2014) "James Blair Historical Review, Volume 5," James Blair Historical Review: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1 
This Journal is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in James Blair Historical Review by an authorized editor of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, 
please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
1et al.: JBHR, Vol. 5
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014
2James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 5 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
The James Blair
Historical Review
Editorial Board
Deborah Wood, Editor-in-Chief
Amy Schaffman, Managing Editor
Abby Gomulkiewicz, Submissions Editor
Matthew Paganussi, Publicity Manager
Peer reviewers
Samra Asghedom Whitney Fields Elizabeth Miserendino
Jackie Borman Sara Garey-Sage Samantha Payne
Genevieve Brei Noella Handley Carol Peng
Robin Crigler Lauren Jean Margaret Strolle
Stephen D’Alessio Carter Lyon Ricky Tischner
Jakob Deel Kelly Manno Amanda Williams
Faculty Advisors
Dr. Hiroshi Kitamura
Dr. Jeremy Pope
3
et al.: JBHR, Vol. 5
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014
Editor’s Note: 
 I am the James Blair Historical Review’s first Editor-in-
Chief who was not involved with the journal from its inception. It 
is an intimidating charge. In fact, last spring, I nearly did not ap-
ply to be the Editor-in-Chief of JBHR. Senior year was approaching, 
and I meant to cut back on extra-curricular activities, not add them. 
Suddenly running a journal with which I had not previously been 
involved seemed like an especially big challenge, but I ultimately 
chose to pursue the position of JBHR’s Editor-in-Chief because I 
believe very strongly in its mission to encourage undergraduate re-
search through publication. In pursuit of that mission, we have with 
this published 21 such papers from William & Mary—and two more 
from outside The College.
 That’s right! I am not the only new element to JBHR: This 
year, we extended the opportunity of submission to other Virginia 
schools, and we were thrilled to receive papers written by students at 
James Madison University, Hampton University, and Richard Bland 
College, among others. Indeed, two of the following essays are writ-
ten by students at Norfolk State University and the University of Vir-
ginia. I was particularly honored to interact with history departments 
and authors across the state. I believe that expanding our audience in 
Virginia will help foster a sense of a greater undergraduate historical 
community, and I look forward to JBHR’s next steps in solidifying 
its growth.
 Of course, a significantly wider pool for submissions result-
ed in significantly more submissions this year than last. I want to 
thank all of our authors, published or not, for trusting us with their 
papers. Our indomitable peer reviewers have my gratitude for wad-
ing through all of them! I am indebted to our faculty advisors (Dr. 
Hiroshima Kitamura and Dr. Jeremy Pope) and my fellow editors 
(Amy Schaffman, Abby Gomulkiewicz, and Matthew Paganussi).
 On behalf of the entire 2013-2014 Editorial Board, we thank 
you for picking up a copy of the James Blair Historical Review. It 
has been very thoughtfully crafted for your enjoyment and edifica-
tion.
    Sincerely,
    Deborah Wood 
    Editor-in-Chief
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The Editorial Board would like to congratulate Jake 
Douglas, winner of the James Blair Historical Review 
2014 Best Essay Award for his analysis of diverse 
Keynes-related documents in “The Passing of the Car-
thaginian Peace: Keynes, Britain, and the Reparations 
Questions, 1918-1920.”
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Douglas Carthaginian PeaCe 9
the Passing of the Carthaginian PeaCe:
Keynes, Britain, and the Reparations Question, 1918-1920
 Jake Douglas, The College of William & Mary
“No! The economist is not king; quite true. But he ought to be! 
He is a better and wiser governor than the general or the diplo-
matist or the oratorical governor.”
 —J.M. Keynes, article in the Manchester Guardian 
Commercial, 19221
Introduction
Rarely has an economist enjoyed such influence in his own 
lifetime as John Maynard Keynes. No one disputes that designation. 
Yet one man in his time plays many parts. Keynes served His Maj-
esty’s Government in both World Wars and attended the 1919 Paris 
Peace Conference as a member of the British Delegation. A strident 
critic of the Treaty of Versailles he failed to avert, Keynes was a 
prolific writer during the interwar period, authoring several books 
and dozens of articles and editorials. He has been rightly called, in 
the words of his mentee Austin Robinson, an economist, an author, 
and a statesman.2 
For interwar Europe, Keynes was most influential as a public 
propagandist. A self-ascribed evangelist for liberal internationalism, 
he even titled one collection of his own writings “Essays in Persua-
sion.”3 In Paris, Keynes resigned from the British delegation in a fit 
of humiliation and rage, convinced the victors were imposing a “Car-
thaginian peace” on defeated Germany and Austria.4 The economic 
and reparations clauses of the Treaty were so onerous, he believed, 
that their realization was simultaneously impossible and ruinous 
for European economic vitality. The dictates of Britain and France 
would only succeed in starving the German people and exposing all 
of Europe to the specter of Bolshevism. If the Germans were to pay 
this tax at all, it would be in blood. 
Keynes broadcasted his plea for revision of the Treaty in The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace, published in Britain on De-
cember 12, 1919. The book delivered a unifying ideology for those 
9
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beginning to doubt the settlement’s prudence and morality. The read-
ership was vast, and its influence is obvious from the correspondence 
of British statesmen. In taking the first steps towards appeasement, 
“perhaps,” wrote A.J.P. Taylor, “they were influenced by the writ-
ings of Keynes.”5 Indeed, the economist’s strictures weighed heavily 
upon the post-Versailles conferences of 1920.
Keynes was not solely responsible for shifting British policy 
towards revision in the early 1920s. Nevertheless, John Maynard 
Keynes was instrumental in accelerating the transformation of Brit-
ish policy from penalty to leniency, and he uniquely contributed to 
the passing, as it were, of a Carthaginian peace. “It would doubtless 
be a profitable task,” in the words of a famous critic, “to inquire into 
the Historical Causes of Mr. Keynes.”6 
Pre-Armistice Agreement
 Fighting on the Western front officially ended on November 
11, 1918, with the signing of the Armistice agreement between Ger-
many and the Allies. Exhausted and demoralized, the German war 
effort was on the brink of collapse. Yet the Reich was not vanquished 
decisively on the battlefield; there was no unconditional surrender. 
The Armistice was a conditional agreement between legally equal 
parties. It was a situation that conferred Germany some assurances 
and guarantees.
 The ceasefire was predicated upon the fulfillment of princi-
ples found in President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points and asso-
ciated speeches. The German Note of October 5, 1918, accepted the 
legitimacy of Wilson’s Fourteen Points and requested an armistice. 
Following a series of communications between German and Allied 
Governments, Wilson transmitted his own Note back on November 
5, 1918. He confirmed all parties had declared their willingness to 
end the war “on the terms of peace laid down in the President’s Ad-
dress to Congress of January 8, 1918 [the Fourteen Points], and the 
principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses.”7 
The Allies’ sole caveat was that Germany be held accountable for 
“all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and to their 
property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the 
air.”8 The “limiting quality” of these terms is further corroborated 
by the text of later addresses. In his speech to Congress on February 
11, 1918, Wilson vowed the European peace would include neither 
10
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“contributions” nor “punitive damages.”9
 These were the conditions on which Great Britain could le-
gally demand payment from Germany at the Paris Peace Conference. 
Because of its peculiar role in the war as an “offshore balancer,” 
Britain had suffered little civilian damage relative to France and Bel-
gium. A strict interpretation of the terms listed above meant, there-
fore, that Britain could only claim damages to “civilian life and prop-
erty” due to “air raids, naval bombardments, submarine warfare, and 
mines,” as well as “compensation for improper treatment of interned 
civilians.”10 The direct expenses of warfighting, as well as indirect 
damages such as lost trade incurred during the war, were on Britain’s 
tab.11
 At first glance, “damage to the civilian population” seems an 
innocuous phrase—secure from any ambiguity that might allow the 
Allies to demand larger indemnities. Yet almost immediately, long 
dormant political tides demanding punishment for Germany swept 
across Great Britain. Soon the work of “the sophists and the law-
yers… discover[ed] in the written word what was not there,” and the 
claims of British politicians came to cover nearly the entire cost of 
the war.12
Election of 1918
A general election was announced for early December three 
days after the Armistice.13 It was the first held in Britain since 1910. 
The election quickly morphed into a bedlam of acrimony as “anti-
Germanism became the fever of the moment.”14 Albeit less so than 
Belgium or France, Britain had suffered terribly in the Great War. 
Millions of casualties were no easy burden. The crushing weight of 
war debt had continually strained public finance. A painful task of 
reconstruction lay ahead. As Winston Churchill observed with haunt-
ing expression,
The brave people whom nothing had daunted had suf-
fered too much. Their unpent feelings were lashed by 
the popular press into fury. The crippled and mutilated 
soldiers darkened the streets. The returned prisoners told 
the hard tale of bonds and privation. Every cottage had 
its empty chair. Hatred of the beaten foe, thirst for his 
punishment, rushed up from the hearts of deeply injured 
millions.15
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The oft-cited poetry of Rudyard Kipling, who lost a son to German 
artillery, was prescient in 1917 of the fierce vindictiveness to come: 
“We have only the memory left of [our children’s] home-treasured 
sayings and laughter / The price of our loss shall be paid to our hands, 
not another’s hereafter.”16
Across the country, demagogues mounted campaign stages 
spouting fire and brimstone. The Conservatives—coalition partners 
of Prime Minister Lloyd George’s Liberal party—smelled blood and 
forced Liberal and Labour party candidates alike towards more puni-
tive campaign slogans like “Hang the Kaiser” and “Make Germany 
Pay.”17 Financier and journalist Horatio Bottomley advised Britons 
that “if by chance you should discover one day in a restaurant that 
you are being served by a German waiter, you will throw the soup in 
his foul face; if you find yourself sitting at the side of a German clerk, 
you will spill the inkpot over his vile head.”18 Bottomley sailed into 
office as an MP that year with eighty percent of the vote.19
Those who opposed harsh terms for Germany were not so 
successful. Herbert Henry Asquith, leader of the Liberal party since 
1908, did not want Germany destroyed. In the year preceding the 
election, Asquith argued for a “Clean Peace,” reasoning that heavy 
reparations would constitute “a ‘veiled war’ continu[ed] ‘by other 
methods.’”20 A local Conservative candidate ousted Asquith from the 
East Fife seat he had occupied since 1886.21 He did not return to 
Parliament until 1920.
The Prime Minister himself was no “high reparationer.” At 
a meeting of Liberal MPs on November 12, 1918, he swore that an 
oppressive peace would inspire German revanchism, drawing a par-
allel to the harsh penalty forced on France in 1871.22 He believed the 
Great War began fundamentally as a result of miscommunication and 
had wrecked what had historically been neutral Anglo-German rela-
tions.23 Lloyd George maintained in his memoirs that
So far as my own view is concerned, it is on record that 
I never thought Germany could pay these huge sums. 
Speaking at Bristol on December 11th, 1918, in the course 
of the election campaign, I said: ‘If I were to say to you, 
not merely that Germany ought to pay, but that we can 
expect every penny, I should be doing so without giving 
you the whole of the facts…’24
His caution notwithstanding, the Prime Minister’s slogans soon in-
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cluded “Make Germany Pay.”25 Lloyd George rode the wave of anti-
German zeal, and as Bernard Baruch observed, “the English people, 
by an overwhelming majority, return[ed] to power their Prime Min-
ister on the basis of an increase in the severity of these terms of 
the peace, especially those of reparation.”26 The stage was set for a 
vindictive peace.
Keynes and the Conference
 The wrath of British public opinion had not subsided by the 
time of the Allies met in Versailles. Even if they did not personally 
support punishing Germany, British, French, and Belgian delegates 
alike felt constrained by their domestic political conditions. The con-
ference was in essence an act in defining for whom the peace was to 
be just. As American delegate Bernard Baruch conjectured,
If the ideal peace…had been actually undertaken, with all 
that it seemingly involved of sacrifice and unselfishness, 
the result would have been the overthrow of at least three 
of the major governments. It would have been followed 
further by the substitution of other representatives who 
would have come into power under a popular mandate re-
quiring them to be even more exacting in their terms.27
As head of a minority party in a coalition government with the Con-
servatives, David Lloyd George depended on support from across 
the British political spectrum. The need for political subservience 
moderated whatever hopes he held for a temperate peace. In late 
March and early April, the British press and the House of Commons 
challenged his claim to leadership. Standing in for the Prime Min-
ister, MP Bonar Law was roundly attacked in an indemnity debate 
with the Conservative rank-and-file, or backbenchers.28 On April 8, 
three hundred members of the House of Commons dispatched a tele-
gram to Lloyd George demanding the fulfillment of his campaign 
pledges.29 So blunt was this act that George felt compelled to return 
to London and address Parliament, reassuring his countrymen that he 
““want[ed] a stern peace, because the occasion demands it. The crime 
demands it.’”30 Given these external constraints, the Prime Minister 
determined to set upon the most politically acceptable path: Britain 
must squeeze every penny out of German coffers and industry.31
 The Prime Minister surrounded himself with three men who 
shared the rancorous expectations of their national publics. Prime 
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Minister of the Australian Commonwealth William Morris Hughes 
made a habit of demagoguery while in Paris.32 At one point, he “in-
sisted that every Australian who had placed a mortgage on his house 
to buy a war bond was as definitely entitled to reparation as was 
every Frenchman whose house had been burned by the Germans.”33 
Even before its signing, Hughes had publicly refused to accept the 
narrow terms of the Pre-Armistice agreement.34 Lord Sumner of Ib-
stone John Andrew Hamilton had been a lord of appeal in ordinary 
and a famous lawyer. When cautioned by the Prime Minister “that 
too much severity might push Germany into Bolshevism, he replied, 
… ‘In that case the Germans will be cutting each others’ throats, and 
there is nothing I would like better.’”35 Together with Lord Cunliffe, 
an ex-governor of the Bank of England, these three “high reparation-
ers” represented Britain’s most parochial interests.36
 Keynes detested these men, especially the Lords Sumner 
and Cunliffe. As McGill Professor John A. Hall writes, “in Keynes’s 
demonology of the Conference, Sumner stood, like Lucifer, at the 
apex, worse even than his satellite Cunliffe. Cunliffe was trouble-
some because he plucked figures from the sky and threw his consid-
erable weight behind them.”37 The “astronomical” reparations figures 
the two devised led Keynes to style them the “Heavenly Twins.”38 
Keynes again described them in nightmarish terms in one of his note-
books: “A remarkable couple protected British interests, the Lords 
Sumner and Cunliffe—as though—it seemed to onlookers—a vul-
ture were bedfellow with a pig, the one tearing the flesh from the 
dying victim but it was the other who was gorged.”39
 In Keynes’s estimation, the Lords had no expertise in in-
ternational affairs. They were above all campaign advisors. Lloyd 
George, Keynes observed to Sir Bradbury, frequently asked him and 
the Twins to prepare the same memoranda separately. Keynes’s ad-
vice was of economic and practical relevance; theirs was political. 
The Prime Minister might then strive for a “middle course.”40 As he 
wrote to Chancellor of the Exchequer Austen Chamberlain about the 
Lords after the Conference, 
The Prime Minister was never under the slightest illu-
sion as to the value of their advice. They were, as he well 
knew, the price he had to pay for electioneering. If I were 
to give the whole story of his relations with those two as I 
know it as first hand, I do not think the world would hold 
14
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him excused.41
Guided by the Twins, not Keynes, the Prime Minister finally com-
mitted to one of the broadest construction of “damage done to the 
civilian population” imaginable; he claimed that Germany was li-
able for all British servicemen’s disability and death pensions.42 As 
Sumner argued, a soldier is “‘simply a civilian called to arms in the 
cause of justice; his uniform makes no difference.’”43 They reasoned 
it was unjust “that Germany was to pay compensation for a broken 
chimney-pot on a French cottage, but not for the dependents of a 
British soldier killed defending it.”44 The ulterior motive was to en-
large the slice of the pie that Britain was entitled to as a contributor in 
the war of troops but not occupied territory. In desperation to fix an 
agreement, President Wilson acceded to Lloyd George’s unyielding 
demand on April 1.
 Keynes was devastated. The terms to be imposed on Germa-
ny were not only prohibitive but also in violation to Britain’s previ-
ous engagements. In writing to his mother, Keynes expressed a deep 
sense of personal failure.45 On May 26, he wrote to Chamberlain 
about his justifications for leaving:
We have presented a draft treaty to the Germans which 
contains much that is unjust and much more that is in-
expedient…If this policy is pursued, the consequences 
will be disastrous in the extreme…I cannot express how 
strongly I feel as to the gravity of what is in front of us, 
and I must have my hands quite free….The Prime Min-
ister is leading us all into a morass of destruction…How 
can you expect me to assist at this tragic farce any longer, 
seeking to lay the foundations, as a Frenchman puts it, 
‘d’une guerre juste et durable’?46
The British Government, now hostile to a real peace, had no place 
for Keynes. On June 5, Keynes tendered a letter of resignation to 
Lloyd George, “leav[ing] the twins to gloat over the devastation of 
Europe and to assess to taste what remains for the British taxpayer.”47
Europe after the Treaty
 Keynes departed Paris in June 1919 in a state of vexation. 
Many in Parliament and the British delegation shared this lack of 
sentimentality for the Conference. But for much of the remaining 
year as Keynes began writing his critique, optimism for the Treaty as 
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a whole was politically ascendant in Britain. By late fall, however, 
reports of the Continent’s deteriorating economic and political con-
ditions began to chip away at expectations that the Treaty could, after 
all, be moderately easy to fulfill.
 On July 21, Mr. Thomas Shaw, an MP from Preston and a 
junior whip for the Labour party, addressed the House of Commons 
as it was debating the adoption of the Treaty. While still affirming his 
overall support, he questioned some of its provisions in relation to 
the Pre-Armistice Agreement:
The Armistice was definitely arranged…on the Fourteen 
Points…Is there a right hon. or hon. Gentleman here who 
will claim that the annexation for fifteen years of the Saar 
Valley is not a distinct violation of the terms upon which 
the Armistice was signed? If that be the fact, in what re-
spect are we better than the Germans were when they tore 
up the scrap of paper [Belgian neutrality]?48
His probe outraged another MP Mr. J. Jones who interrupted ad ho-
minem, “We are not to be insulted by members from Jerusalem! Are 
we to stand insults from a Jew?”49 Shaw was not Jewish, but the use 
of anti-Semitic attacks shows the antipathy with which revision was 
still regarded. Also in the Commons that July, Lloyd George affirmed 
the justice of the Treaty despite his constant personal reservations. 
He maintained, “if the whole cost of the war, all the costs incurred 
by every country that has been forced into war by the action of Ger-
many, had been thrown upon Germany, it would have been in accord 
with every principle of civilized jurisprudence in the world.”50 Brit-
ain’s war fever was still running high.
 Meanwhile, Keynes had begun what was to become his sem-
inal work. General Jan Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa and 
Keynes’s closest ally in Paris, was the original inspiration. While 
leaving the conference, Smuts urged Keynes to write an economic 
critique of the Treaty’s provisions. It would be for mass consump-
tion, “not be too long or technical, as we may want to appeal to 
the plain man more than to the well informed or the specialist.”51 
Keynes’s target audience had become the general public. In the light 
Paris had shown on the nature of populist politics, he saw that “it was 
very doubtful how far the various governments concerned would be 
prepared to act unless they were stimulated by outside action.”52
 General Smuts soon had second thoughts about the essay, 
16
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but Keynes was not so easily deterred.53 His spirits rose with encour-
agement from other members of the British political elite. On July 
17, Keynes wrote to Lord Robert Cecil, chairman of the Supreme 
Economic Council:
After some weeks of rest and reflection, I find I take a not 
less pessimistic view as to the prospects of Europe and of 
European order, unless early steps are taken to make and 
admit as a dead letter many of the economic clauses of the 
treaty. Do you agree? Has not the time come for explain-
ing a little what a damnable and disastrous document the 
treaty is?54
An admirer of Keynes, Cecil responded that “all [he said] shall be 
most carefully considered” by the Council, but in the interim, Keynes 
should write “a brilliant article…exposing from a strictly economic 
point of view the dangers of the treaty.”55 Keynes devoted himself to 
this task until early December.
 That summer, elation over the conclusion of the Treaty still 
gripped many members of Parliament with romanticism. Mr. Ad-
amson, MP from Fife Western, spoke before the Commons about 
an “ideal” “spirit of reconciliation.”56 In Adamson’s calculation, not 
only could the harsh terms of the Treaty be fulfilled, but also Ger-
many could welcome them with open arms—Britain and Germany 
together sweeping away all national animosities from the littered 
battlefields of Europe. The foundations of this fanciful thinking be-
gan to crack as the year wore on. 
 By November, the British Parliament became aware that 
Central Europe—in particular Austria but also Germany—had fallen 
into near total economic dislocation. On October 30, the Prime Min-
ister stated in the Commons that “Germany this year is broken. Her 
people are enfeebled and her production has fallen 40 per cent.”57 
Bonar Law, leader of the Coalition Conservatives, conceded the 
point but maintained he had no doubts a reasonable sum could be 
extracted from Germany in the near future.58 On November 20, Lord 
Cecil urged the Prime Minister to consider what impact further deg-
radation in Austria and Central Europe might have on the European 
security.59 By December 4, MP Lord Henry Cavendish-Bentinck ad-
monished the Prime Minister that,
In order to prevent a further collapse of economic life in 
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Central Europe, he would use his influence to have either 
the Council or the Assembly of the League of Nations, or 
both, summoned, in order that the League might itself ini-
tiate measures for international credit, or any other mea-
sures of international co-operation necessary to prevent a 
further international economic breakdown…60
Slowly awakening to the hopelessness of the terms of Versailles be-
ing satisfied in the near term, Britain was ready for a framework to 
help it understand the complexities of the economic problems facing 
Europe. That framework, a liberal internationalist apology for revi-
sion, appeared between the pages of Keynes’s book.
Economic Consequences of the Peace
 Keynes’s treatise begins with a challenge to its English 
reader: “the British people received the Treaty without reading it.”61 
The leaders of Europe, he argued, had deceived by their peoples into 
believing in the dictates of an impossible Treaty. His purpose, he 
continued, was “to show that the Carthaginian Peace is not practical-
ly right or possible.”62 Keynes thrusts a hard truth onto his readers, 
something that by the start of 1920 they already knew with frighten-
ing certitude: “In continental Europe the earth heaves and no one but 
is aware of the rumblings. There it is…a matter of…life and death, 
of starvation and existence, and of the fearful convulsions of a dy-
ing civilization.”63 Central Europe was in its death throes, no doubt, 
but the war was not alone responsible for its poor lot. No, since the 
war, the allies had “abus[ed] their momentary victorious power to 
destroy” their erstwhile adversaries.64 Indeed,
So far as possible…it was the policy of France to set the 
clock back and to undo what, since 1870, the progress 
of Germany had accomplished. By loss of territory and 
other measures, her population was to be curtailed; but 
chiefly the economic system, upon which she depended 
for her new strength, the vast fabric built upon iron, coal, 
and transport must be destroyed.65
This scheme of national vengefulness had been obscured from public 
view because it was “clothed, for [President Wilson’s] sake, in the 
august language of freedom and international equality.”66 Lip service 
was paid to Wilsonian ideals, but “it would be stupid to believe that 
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there is much room in the world, as it really is, for such affairs as the 
League of Nations, or any sense in the principle of self-determina-
tion except as an ingenuous formula for rearranging the balance of 
power in one’s own interests.”67 
 The economic and reparations clauses of the Treaty, wrote 
Keynes, “are comprehensive, and little has been overlooked which 
might impoverish Germany now or obstruct her development in the 
future.”68 Before the war, German vitality was essential for the eco-
nomic health of Central (as well as Western and Northern) Europe. 
Now the allies aimed at the “systematic destruction” of the German 
industrial giant.69 Under the Treaty, Germany ceded to the Allies all 
of her merchant marine vessels, all her rights and titles over her over-
sea possessions, all public and private property in Alsace-Lorraine, 
the coal-mines of the Saar Basin and Upper Silesia, and most of her 
rolling stock.70 Out of what little resources remained, Germany was 
obliged to replace yearly the losses France and Belgium sustained in 
coal production as a consequence of the war.71 These charges were 
demanded outright; their forfeiture would in no way reduce the total 
indemnity eventually demanded of Germany. “Thus,” said Keynes, 
“Germany’s influence is eliminated and her capital confiscated in all 
those neighboring countries to which she might naturally look for 
her future livelihood, and for an outlet for her energy, enterprise, 
and technical skill.”72 This burden was further imposed by a clause 
guaranteeing the Reparation Commission “dictatorial powers over 
all Germany property of every description whatever.”73
Using inferential logic and pre-war statistical data, Keynes 
calculated both the maximum indemnity for which Germany was li-
able based on the Pre-Armistice Agreement and the maximum she 
was capable of paying over thirty years: £10,000 million and £2,000 
million, respectively. A major component of the latter figure, as well, 
would have to be realized by the material transfers listed above. 
Since “Germany’s capacity to pay will be exhausted by the direct 
and legitimate claims which the allies hold against her, the question 
of her contingent liability…becomes academic. Prudent and honor-
able statesmanship would therefore have given her the benefit of the 
doubt.”74
 The Treaty did not enumerate a specific, fixed indemnity. 
However, Keynes reasoned from the text of the economic and repa-
rations clauses that the Allies could now demand at least £40,000 
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million, an order of magnitude higher than what Germany could ever 
feasibly pay. Moreover, the lack of a fixed indemnity meant that the 
figure could be revised upwards periodically as the German econo-
my recovered, locking Germany into the Allies’ permanent debt.
Thus were the terms of the Treaty a practical impossibility. 
Germany could not pay the astronomical sums demanded by the Al-
lies. Britain and France would never be compensated—all the more 
so if they destroyed the machine tasked to remunerate them by their 
severity of their demands. As President Wilson asserted to Lloyd 
George in 1919,
You have suggested that we all address ourselves to the 
problem of helping to put Germany on her feet, but how 
can your experts or ours be expected to work out a new 
plan to furnish working capital to Germany when we de-
liberately start out by taking away all Germany’s present 
capital? How can anyone expect America to turn over to 
Germany in any considerable measure new working capi-
tal to take the place of that which the European nations 
have determined to take from her?75
If this “European Civil War” was continued by economic means, 
Keynes prophesied, the victors would “invite their own destruction 
also, being so deeply and inextricably intertwined with their victims 
by hidden psychic and economic bonds.”76 Economic depression 
threatened Bolshevism, militarism, or anarchy in Central Europe. 
These movements could not leave Western Europe unscathed. “How 
greatly,” resolves Keynes, “if it is to understand its destiny, the world 
needs light.”77
Reception in Britain
 The Economic Consequences of the Peace became a classic 
of the English language virtually overnight.78 It made publishing his-
tory in 1920, selling more than 60,000 copies in the United States and 
Britain in the first two months. The Labour Party sold tens of thou-
sands of a special cheap edition for a fourth the cost.79 Keynes sent 
73 advance copies to a group that included H.H. Asquith, Bonar Law, 
Austen Chamberlain, General Smuts, Lord Robert Cecil, Reginald 
McKenna, Winston Churchill, Lord Beaverbrook, Edwin Montagu, 
A.J. Balfour, Sir John Bradbury, and Sir Robert Chalmers.80 The pub-
lishing of his book was, in Keynes’s own account, “followed by con-
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gratulations from half the Cabinet, and invitations from three parties 
to stand for Parliament!”81 In the following months, The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace was reviewed by hundreds of journals 
and translated into dozens of languages.82 As late as August 1920, 
Keynes’s book was still selling at a rate of 200 copies per week, even 
excluding the cheap Labour edition.83 By 1924, “‘it had been read,’ 
in the opinion of Sir William Beveridge, ‘by—at a moderate com-
putation—half a million people who never read an economic work 
before and probably will not read one again’.”84
By this time, Keynes held the stature of an ultimate “au-
thority” or “expert” in Britain—an impartial demigod in all matters 
economic. The British weekly political and literary review Time and 
Tide published a personality sketch of Keynes in July 1921: “Persons 
of all parties and nationalities seek out and consult him; he is acces-
sible, quite without any sort of personal arrogance, and endowed, in 
a high degree, with the power of making half an hour’s conversation 
an event that lives in the memory and feeds the mind.”85 A December 
2, 1920, article in the Manchester Guardian introduced Keynes as 
“the most distinguished British authority on the whole question of 
‘reparation’.”86
 Keynes received one of his first responses on December 22, 
1919, from Austen Chamberlain. The Chancellor expressed some re-
gret that “a late public servant” would risk damaging his country’s 
image abroad with irreverent rhetoric. Yet, continued Chamberlain, 
“I wish I thought your reasoning as to Germany’s capacity to pay, 
and your picture of the economic state of Europe, less accurate than I 
do. I think you a little too pessimistic, but in the main I believe you to 
be right.”87 Chamberlain’s response is typical for British politicians 
and journalists already doubtful of the practicability of the Treaty. 
On January 14, 1920, a poem titled “The Candour of Keynes” was 
printed in Punch magazine:
There was a superior young person named KEYNES
Who possessed an extensive equipment of brains…
So, after five months of progressive disgust,
He shook from his feet the Parisian dust,…
And his arguments cannot be lightly dismissed
With cries of ‘Pro-Hun’ or of ‘Pacifist’…
Still we feel, as he zealously damns the Allies
For grudging the Germans the means to arise
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That possibly some of the Ultimate Things
May even be hidden from Fellows of King’s.
Acceptance of Keynes economic strictures and hesitation for his 
political ones: these were the key twin features for most responses. 
This led Keynes, time and time again in personal correspondence, 
authored articles, and discussions with MPs, to state that no one seri-
ously challenged his claims any longer.88 
In a letter to The Times titled “Mr. Keynes’s Demand for 
Revisions,” Keynes received his first “serious and responsible criti-
cism” from John Foster Dulles, former legal adviser to the American 
financial delegation in Paris. As Keynes observed in a reply to The 
Times, Dulles did not dispute his £2,000 million figure for Germany’s 
capacity to pay.89 They agreed on the economic fundamentals. What 
Dulles did contest was Keynes’s censure of the Reparation Commis-
sion’s “dictatorial powers.” For Dulles, the commission’s freedom 
opened an avenue for
An intelligent alleviation of terms and modes of payment 
in the event that they prove to be excessive; the whole 
operation to be akin to that of a settlement in which the 
creditors recognize that their own interest lies in preserv-
ing and enhancing the economic vitality of their debtor.90
Writing in his memoirs years later, David Lloyd George came to a 
very similar conclusion.91 Bernard Baruch held that “steps are pro-
vided in the elastic mechanism for the Reparation Commission which 
will enable us, in the calmer days to come, to climb nearer perfec-
tion.”92 Keynes, however, believed that only formal treaty revision 
would relieve European relations of the friction of the reparations 
debate.93 “Until the treaty is formally revised,” Keynes averred, “it 
is wiser and safer to take seriously some even of [the Treaty’s] more 
extravagant clauses.”94
The impact of Keynesianism was felt throughout the Brit-
ish government. Mr. H. D. Beaumont, British Commissioner on 
the Interallied Commission for the Administration and Plebiscite in 
Marienwerder (East Prussia), wrote to Foreign Secretary Earl Cur-
zon in February 1920 that “the difficulties foreseen by J. M. Keynes 
(‘Economic Consequences of the Peace’) are more real than when 
he wrote in October last and his pessimism is only too clearly justi-
fied.”95 Keynes’s book was not the only source of information driving 
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doubts about the Treaty, but it provided an ideology that made sense 
of the facts on the ground. Also in February, acting Chargé d’affaires 
at Washington Mr. R. C. Lindsay stressed to Curzon Keynes’s diplo-
matic impact in America: “from the point of view of Anglo-Ameri-
can relations, I would think it wise for His Majesty’s Government to 
follow a [conciliatory] course in the matter of reparation.”96
 The Economic Consequences of the Peace featured promi-
nently in a House of Commons debate over the peace settlement on 
February 12, 1920. Sir William Mitchell-Thomson began by roundly 
denouncing Keynes, arguing much like Chamberlain that he had 
damaged the Allies’ negotiating position abroad. He maintained that 
if treaty revision ultimately proved necessary, the Reparations Com-
mission, not the advocacy of Mr. Keynes, should conduct it. He did 
not seriously critique Keynes’s economics, however, stating that “he 
may be right, he may be wrong, but who can say?”97 Bonar Law de-
fended Keynes to a point, arguing that
Anyone who has read his book or listened to his argument 
would feel that judging by the experience of the world in 
the past it is very difficult to see how the Germans can 
pay outside their own country even the sum which I think 
they ought to be made to pay. That is true, but things do 
not turn out in this world precisely as you expect them to 
turn out.98
Law defended his own political behavior and that of the House dur-
ing the Paris Peace Conference, asking “what human being could 
have put… any figure which by any possibility could have been re-
garded as one that under all the circumstances would be fair and 
reasonable? It was not possible.”99 Applying the same coping mecha-
nism as Mitchell-Thompson, Law opened the possibility of treaty 
revision while protecting his self-image and reputation. 
A.J. Balfour denounced Keynes as a German apologist and 
dismissed his £2,000 million figure for Germany’s capacity to pay 
altogether, holding that “Germany herself… plac[es] her maximum 
possible contribution at two and a half times… above that which 
Mr. Keynes fixed.”100 Keynes contacted Balfour personally, direct-
ing him to a passage in The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
demonstrating that when correcting for technicalities, the German 
offer of £5,000 million actually only amounted to £1,500 million. 
Balfour renounced his allegation publically in a letter to The Times 
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on February 24.101 Perhaps this had some effect on his anti-Keynesite 
campaign.
Nearly all contemporaries wrote that Keynes’s book had ef-
fected a massive shift in British public opinion away from harsh rep-
arations almost immediately. On New Year’s Eve 1919, Lord Robert 
Cecil congratulated Keynes on his triumph, claiming that it “ ha[d] 
produced and will produce great and increasing changes in public 
opinion.”102 On March 20, 1920, Basil Blackett, a British Treasury 
official, wrote to Keynes, “Your book has undoubtedly borne some 
fruit, and though as you know I am not a whole-hearted admirer of 
it, I readily give you the credit for much of the advance in British 
and other public opinion.”103 Britain was becoming less unforgiv-
ing. This transformation would allow politicians like David Lloyd 
George to begin the task of revision, gradual and de facto if not de 
jure as Keynes preferred.
Post-Paris Conferences of 1920
“‘Hope,’” wrote French critic Étienne Mantoux, “‘hope’ 
was what Mr. Keynes was offering in 1919.” Indeed, notes Professor 
Richard Grayson, “The Economic Consequences of the Peace…pro-
vided the intellectual foundation of Liberal proposals for revising the 
economic settlement of Europe in the 1920s.”104 In 1920, that project 
was admittedly modest. Nonetheless, Liberal politicians made small, 
definite gains at post-Versailles international conferences in 1920.
H.H. Asquith, leader of the Liberal party, returned to Par-
liament in the 1920 Paisley by-election. Sensing a shift in public 
opinion, Asquith and other Liberals began demanding that the repa-
rations bill be fixed and lowered immediately.105 He never said so in 
public, but Asquith’s quick adoption of the figure £2,000 million for 
Germany’s capacity to pay could have come from only one source—
The Economic Consequences of the Peace. MP Mitchell-Thomson, 
at the February 12th debate in the House of Commons, felt “bound 
to say I have a strong suspicion that, although the voice was the 
voice of Paisley, the inspiration really comes from somewhere very 
close to King’s College, Cambridge.”106
Perhaps inspired by Asquith’s reelection, the Prime Minister 
began snaking his way back to a moderate position on reparations. 
Keynes observed him closely: 
The deeper and the fouler the bogs into which Mr. Lloyd 
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George leads us, the more credit is his for getting us out. 
He leads us in to satisfy our desires; he leads us out to 
save our souls. He hands us down the primrose path and 
puts out the bonfire just in time. Who, ever before, en-
joyed the best of heaven and hell as we do?107
Through the entire period, Keynes’s opinion of George was deeply 
torn. He vacillated between spitting ethnic epithets about leprechauns 
(Lloyd George was Welsh) to praising his ingenious knack for poli-
ticking. In 1920, the latter sentiment won out as the Prime Minister 
carefully obviated the worst features of the Treaty’s economic and 
reparations clauses.
  The European powers held six conferences in 1920. At San 
Remo from April 19 to 26, Lloyd George was forced to pledge to 
maintain the overall integrity of the Treaty to French Premier Mil-
lerand. Yet he succeeded in convincing the French to allow a Ger-
man party to attend the Spa conference that summer. In his speech 
to the House of Commons upon his return, the Prime Minister an-
nounced his intention for a loose interpretation.108 A fixed indemnity 
was tentatively selected at Boulogne on June 21 and 22. The total, 
269,000,000,000 gold marks, fell to 226,000,000,000 at the Paris 
conference at the beginning of 1921.109 At Spa on July 5-16, 1920, 
British, French, and German delegates conducted negotiations face-
to-face and settled on a schedule of payments for coal deliveries.110 
1920’s last conference, December 16-22 in Brussels, was also its 
most significant. Germany, Britain, and France agreed upon leniency 
in payment until 1923; payment in material deliveries not cash; a 
limitation on total expenses that could be charged for the Allied oc-
cupation armies in the Rhineland; and a waiver for Allied claims to 
demand free German shipbuilding.111 
 Beset by Anglo-French friction over the severity of the terms 
of the Treaty, the atmosphere of each conference was usually hostile. 
Yet, Keynes grasped,
The total effect was cumulative; and by gradual stages the 
project of revising the Treaty gained ground in every quar-
ter. The Conferences furnish an extraordinary example of 
Mr. Lloyd George’s methods. At each of them he pushed 
the French as far as he could, but not as far as he wanted; 
and then came home to acclaim the settlement provision-
ally reached (and destined to be changed a month later) 
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as an expression of complete accord between himself and 
his French colleague…he steadily gained his object.112
These tactics won the Prime Minister no friends in France. Neither, 
though, did the shadow of Keynes. “Pertinax,” anonymous editor of 
the Paris Echo, wrote in July 1920 on the Spa Agreement that “un-
expectedly between the covers of a book appears the great opponent 
whose strength Millerand must overcome…The ideas set forth in 
this volume are permeating the whole atmosphere of the Spa Confer-
ence.”113 In an August letter to The Times, French economist Henri 
Brenier grumbled that “British opinion has been so poisoned by Mr 
Keynes’s paradoxes and fallacies—(which, we sincerely hope, will 
be exploded some time by indisputable figures), that it is really nec-
essary to insist with some detail on Germany’s ‘coal-capacity’ to 
pay at least.”114 Whether through his direct economic counsel or the 
freedom from fear of political repercussion that his advocacy had 
extended to treaty revisionists, every conference felt Keynes’s pres-
ence. Notwithstanding that Keynes played no role in the Spa Coal 
Agreement, T.E. Lawrence sent him a note upon its resolution say-
ing, simply, “In the Times today—magnificent! Do keep it up.”115
Conclusion
 History remembers John Maynard Keynes principally as an 
economist, sometimes as a statesman. Seldom do we think of him 
as the marketer of an ideology. Yet it is obvious from the histori-
cal record that this profession consumed most of his time and all 
of his passions for years after the war. The image of a man pull-
ing at the heartstrings of a desperate public is not unusual for the 
time period. Hence the question of how much one person can mold 
the worldviews of whole countries bears real weight. The impact of 
Keynes and The Economic Consequences of the Peace in the early 
days of interwar Britain was substantial. Certainly his efforts con-
stituted some of the first steps towards appeasement. It is difficult to 
know whether Britain would have settled its reparations question in 
a Keynes-less vacuum. This is always true with history, but maybe 
it is all the more so because it is simply impossible to conceive of a 
post-war Britain without John Maynard Keynes.
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solidarity in slavery:
Examining Urban Slavery in Brazil
 Rachel Azfrani, The College of William & Mary
 The African slave trade drove the Brazilian economy in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, permanently impacting the 
demographic and cultural composition of the area. The millions of 
slaves that arrived in Brazil encountered a series of different fates, 
largely determined by where they landed and the work they per-
formed. While the majority of slaves were sent to work on rural 
plantations, the quickly developing urban areas of Brazil attracted 
a growing market for the slave trade. As the population of Africans 
came to outnumber the Portuguese population, the struggle to adapt 
a social hierarchy ensued in urban regions. Attempting to create a 
social network while shaping autonomy generated fierce competi-
tion between slaves. The social, religious, and economic activities 
of urban Brazil influenced the ethnic solidarity of African slaves in 
their occupational lives and in their social interactions both within 
the enslaved community and with the Portuguese population. Ulti-
mately, the tensions provoked by these conditions prevented fluid 
ethnic solidarity in Brazilian society.
 The variety of different positions for slaves in urban soci-
ety contributed to the diverse experiences of African slaves. Slaves 
looking to gain opportunities for camaraderie as well as personal ad-
vantages in the urban setting created a startling ethnic discord. Each 
slave brought his or her tribal origins to Brazil, where the various Af-
rican identities immediately clashed and remained divided. Provided 
the opportunity to marry, slaves most often married within their eth-
nic group in an effort to maintain their cultural heritage.1 Even while 
waiting to be sold, the slaves’ actions in urban slave markets show 
their mutual fear of each other’s foreignness. In her Journal of a voy-
age to Brazil, Maria Calcott of Britain describes the anxiety of newly 
purchased slaves and their “listlessness of despair…[The patriots] 
have put arms into the hands of new negroes, while the recollection 
of their own country, and of the slave-ship, and of the slave-market, 
is fresh in their memory.”2 Many tribal groups were traditionally dis-
posed to conflict, and this led to frequent brawls in the city streets 
33
et al.: JBHR, Vol. 5
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014
34 Spring 2014JameS Blair HiStorical review
that housed slave markets. These bursts of violence created signifi-
cant tension in Brazilian urban society, especially during the Latin 
American independence movements when Calcott wrote her travel-
ogue. As slaves integrated into colonial society, they adapted their 
cultural identities and hostilities with them.
 Occupations further stratified the social hierarchy of slaves 
in urban Brazil. The most underprivileged groups were primarily 
united by their loathing for the relatively privileged domestic slaves. 
Urban domestic slaves, especially those belonging to the elite, re-
ceived certain benefits that placed them on a higher social rung than 
other urban slaves. Domestic slaves were sometimes able to escort 
their masters on outings, given a stipend, or given fine clothing in 
order to reflect the status of their master.3 When a slave had a close 
relationship with his master, he increased his chances of manumis-
sion—that is, of being released from slavery—and this exacerbated 
strained relations with other slaves. Calcott observed that relation-
ships between masters and slaves “diminish the evils of slavery to 
one, the tyranny of Mastery to the other.”4 As historian Zephyr Frank 
has outlined, certain jobs possessed certain racial associations, and 
“it meant that in the lower and middle sectors of society there was 
a great deal of crosscutting of social categories: higher-status work 
accorded a ‘lighter’ racial characterization; the work associated with 
slaves carried a ‘darker’ classification.”5 Domestic slavery, although 
strenuous, was looked upon by other urban slaves as one of the most 
esteemed lines of work. Furthermore, the opportunity for domestic 
slaves to attend church with their masters provided a social similarity 
to the Portuguese elite. Calcott’s journals suggest that religion was a 
common ground between slaves and the Portuguese, and “everything 
that [united] men in one common sentiment [was] interesting. The 
church doors were open, the altars illuminated, and the very slave 
felt that he was addressing the same Deity, by the same privilege 
with his master.”6 Those who lacked such stability in their work and 
social standing often found themselves shifting markets to get a job 
wherever they could. The rivalry between different trades contrib-
uted to the lack of solidarity between slaves in urban occupations.
 Urban slaves that worked in outdoor markets often had rela-
tively more social and economic freedom than their domestic coun-
terparts. Urban slave peddlers were often able to keep some of their 
earnings, and thus distinguish themselves from slaves with more 
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formidable tasks. Henry Koster, a British resident of Portugal who 
journeyed to Brazil, observed that enslaved urban women could be 
seen “selling oranges, other kinds of fruits and cakes, and canoe-
men with their long poles, unable to delay, bargaining with them 
for some of their commodities.”7 While the limited freedom of ac-
tion in an outdoor market like the one Koster described empowered 
many urban slaves, this environment fostered conflict. In addition, 
the government, fearful of a black majority, “found it advantageous 
to encourage hostility between Africans and creoles, blacks and mu-
lattoes, freed men and slaves, in order to prevent them from form-
ing a common front against the ruling establishment.”8 Even though 
the government tried to prevent it, slaves that engaged in the same 
trade often formed close bonds with the free blacks and mulattos 
they worked with, especially when they were of the same ethnic 
background. These partnerships can be attributed to the dynastic ur-
ban setting that allowed for the growth of informal economies. Such 
relationships were positive for the solidarity of the entire slave com-
munity, serving as the basis for the foundation of religious confra-
ternities, which played a major role in developing communities for 
slaves in urban Brazil.9
 As societies of mutual aid and brotherhood, these religious 
confraternities provided a framework for limited cooperation and 
solidarity between slaves. The Church was an integral part of an 
African slave’s life from the time he arrived to Brazil to the day 
he died, and it greatly influenced creole slaves from their birth. A 
new slave was completely cut off from their past familial relation-
ships, and they often looked to the Church to find community. Slaves 
who became members of confraternities believed that they had im-
portant rights and responsibilities, and even developed executive 
boards with a “king” and “queen” that mimicked the Portuguese 
royal court.11 Influenced by the traditional West African definition of 
“brother,” which meant sharing origins in the same ethnic group, and 
pressure from their masters to find training within the Church to be-
come skilled workers, slaves formed confraternities with increased 
frequency. Many Portuguese elites felt that this type of solidarity 
through the Church was dangerous to their high status. In his travels, 
Koster recalled that “the number of churches, chapels, and niches in 
the street for saints [of lay brotherhoods], is quite preposterous.”11 
Confraternities provided a popular platform for urban slaves and 
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freed blacks to establish community and develop a semblance of 
solidarity, although outside of these circles they divided the loyalty 
and allegiance of urban slaves to each other.
 As confraternities flourished, the rivalry between them 
sharply contrasted the brotherhood within them. In 1639, two broth-
erhoods united to form the Black Men’s Brotherhood of Our Lady 
of the Rosarió and São Benedito, solidifying its superiority over 
other confraternities. This large organization provided money for 
Christian funerals, owned churches, and established a new means of 
manumission. Although there was positive solidarity between mem-
bers of the same confraternity, relationships between confraternities 
themselves were strained. Koster noted discrimination between con-
fraternities, and that there were clear “shades” of slaves in differ-
ent brotherhoods. In addition, he observed that some confraternities 
were exclusive with the “shades” of their members.12 Some groups 
displayed their superiority over other slaves during religious parades 
by relegating recently arrived slaves to the back of the processions. 
The discrimination against new slaves demonstrates how established 
slaves rarely sympathized with those outside of their social circles. 
The Brothers of the Rosarió, along this vein, wrote a letter to King 
Joseph I, stating that “it would serve your majesty well to annex [the 
lesser black brotherhoods], and in demolishing them and their grue-
some cemeteries Your Majesty would be providing a great service 
to God.”13 This hostility demonstrates how urban slaves struggled to 
differentiate themselves through the European ideals of social class 
during this time period. Although loyalty within confraternities was 
a lifelong bond, the scarcity of cooperation between them illustrates 
a broader lack of solidarity in the enslaved urban community as a 
whole.
 The solidarity of urban slaves in Brazil depended upon oc-
cupation, class, ethnic origin, and gender. Where differences existed, 
a sharp increase in hostility and exclusivity arose, and where simi-
larities occurred, deep and familial bonds between slaves developed. 
Scholars have put an emphasis on solidarity between slaves simply 
because of their status as slaves, but the urban setting of Brazil points 
to an entirely different trend. The stratification of slave society can 
be attributed to movements in the lower and middling classes of both 
Portuguese and Spanish America to distinguish themselves and at-
tempt to rise up the social ladder however they could. Established 
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slaves considered newly arrived slaves to be in the lowest ranks be-
cause they lacked knowledge of European thought.14 Freed black 
slaves often purchased their own slaves so that they could elevate 
themselves by acting similarly to their former white masters.15 With-
in their strategies to establish community as well as their own au-
tonomy, the urban slaves of Brazil perpetuated competition amongst 
themselves. Scholars have often simplified the experiences of slaves 
in colonial Latin America by brushing over their uniqueness, how-
ever, their true complexity mirrored the diversity of the era. Despite 
the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888, the Afro-Brazilian commu-
nity maintained many of their previously held notions of ethnic and 
occupational divisions. These continue to affect perceptions of social 
status within populations of both African and European descent in 
modern urban Brazil.16 Although the struggles of an enslaved life 
would seem to inspire unity, in Brazil, it created irreconcilable dis-
unity.
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Coverage of the international longshoremen’s 
assoCiation in hamPton roads
  Corey Wash, Norfolk State University
 It was roughly 12:00 pm on October 6, 1923 when union-
ized longshoremen in Norfolk and Newport News, Virginia, walked 
out on their jobs after failed negotiations of a new wage scale. The 
longshoremen’s contract was about to expire, and the shipping com-
panies made an offer of 75 cents regular pay and $1.07 for overtime. 
Although the new wage was an increase in 10 cents, the offer was 
not acceptable to the officials of the International Longshoremen As-
sociation (ILA), who were seeking 80 cents regular pay and $1.20 
for overtime, which was the wage that other workers in the North-
Atlantic ports earned. During the strike, the shipping lines brought 
in strike breakers—who worked for the old wage of 65 cents an 
hour—and took out the possibility of organized labor in their deal. 
The three-week-long strike ended in what could be seen as a victory 
for both sides. They did not receive the 80 cents an hour that they 
had hoped for, but the ILA was allowed to continue representing the 
longshoremen in negotiations for better wages and working condi-
tions.1 What made the affiliation of Norfolk’s longshoremen with 
the ILA unique, at the time, was that they were predominantly black 
workers in a mixed-race organization. 
Earl Lewis explained in his book, In Their Own Interests, 
how blacks came to dominate the longshoremen trade in Norfolk by 
the 1920s, how they used their strength in numbers to create two suc-
cessful unions, and how the success of those two unions gained them 
recognition from the ILA.2 This paper will take a closer look at the 
International Longshoremen’s Association by comparing the Virgin-
ian Pilot’s coverage to the Norfolk Journal and Guide, which was 
one of the most prominent African-American papers in the South 
East. This closer look is necessary in order to understand how the 
ILA became one of the most dominant longshoreman’s unions dur-
ing this time. 
 Industrialization and a world war created a high demand for 
labor in the early 20th century, which caused a mass migration from 
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rural to urban areas. Nearly 1.5 million African Americans took part 
in the rural to urban movement known as the great migration and 
many ended up in Norfolk, a city that was emerging as a major ship-
ping center. Between 1910 and 1920, the black population in Norfolk 
nearly doubled from 25,000 to 43,000 people.3 The demand for labor 
during World War I accounted for much of the population increase, 
but as blacks were finding new jobs, the same discrimination they 
faced in everyday life was also found in the workplace. Whites were 
earning more than black workers who did the same work, few blacks 
were able to hold high positions, and most blacks were only allowed 
to work unskilled-labor jobs. In Virginia, the segregation of the work 
force meant that African Americans held dominant roles in certain 
fields. In Norfolk, they made up about 90 percent of the longshore-
men’s trade, and they used their strength in numbers to fight for bet-
ter wages and working conditions.4
 As World War I brought new opportunities for employment, 
the rhetoric that was used to bring the country together gave blacks 
an opportunity to seek advancements in the workplace. The two 
major black organizations that emerged in Norfolk were the Coal 
Trimmers Union Local 15227 and the Transportation Workers As-
sociation (TWA). Together they organized workers in trades domi-
nated by African Americans, including: longshoremen, oyster shuck-
ers, tobacco stemmers, and domestic workers. However, other than 
the longshoremen, the organized workers had little success. Cigar 
stemmers were able to gain higher wages, but their horrible working 
conditions remained the same. Hardly any gains were made by the 
oyster shuckers or domestic workers after city officials used police 
to end their strikes.5
 Because of the limited success of the organization of other 
black-dominated trades, and economic problems brought on by the 
post-war recession, the longshoremen of Norfolk realized they had 
a better opportunity to advance in the workplace by shifting their 
focus away from organizing local black workers and, instead, af-
filiating with a national union. In 1921 the Coal Trimmers Union 
and the TWA joined the ILA. The merger was unique; the ILA was 
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, which rarely al-
lowed blacks to participate in the union.6 The negative effect of the 
merger was that the longshoremen were no longer organized in a 
way that would help the black community as a whole, and in some 
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cases hurt the cause of other black workers. For instance, when black 
longshoremen not affiliated with the ILA went on strike, the union 
used its dominance to ensure that the strike was unsuccessful. But, 
the acceptance of Hampton Road’s longshoremen into the ILA was 
important in the fight for racial equality because it meant that black 
workers would have a prominent role in an interracial union, and an 
opportunity for black leaders like George Milner, who was elected 
Third Vice President of the ILA, to achieve high ranking positions. 
But the merger meant the longshoremen would have to focus their 
attention nationally, and that brought on its own challenges.7
In A People’s History of the United States, Howard Zinn 
changed the narrative of the United State’s history, and gave a voice 
to groups that were overlooked in most textbooks. Workers in the 
early 20th century formed one of the groups Zinn focused on in his 
textbook. He explained towards the end of the 19th, and in the be-
ginning of the 20th century, labor unions were rising up all over the 
United States. Workers were fighting for better wages and condi-
tions, and many of the strikes led to violent clashes between workers 
and police forces. Zinn’s theory was that government officials and 
industrial leaders learned that they could eliminate the threat of radi-
cal labor groups if they allowed the existence of conservative labor 
unions, and made small concessions to workers.8 In the early 1900s, 
government officials and business leaders feared radical, socialist la-
bor unions would disrupt the economy and bring major changes to 
the country.9 The government limited free speech and threw radicals 
in jail in an attempt to deal with the problem, but that only added 
fuel to the fire and gave workers even more reason to rebel. Indus-
trial leaders took a different approach and allowed for small wage 
increases and better working conditions, and by the end of the First 
World War, it appeared that socialism was no longer a threat to the 
country. Later, in the 1930s, communism took on the role that so-
cialism played in the early 1900s, and again leaders granted small 
concessions to workers in order to encourage conservative labor 
unions to keep business uninterrupted. After the First World War, and 
through most the 1920s, the threat of radical labor unions seemed 
to be eliminated. Although strikes still took place, industrial leaders 
were less inclined to make concessions to workers.
 It is in this setting that the strike of 1923 occurred, when the 
longshoremen in the Hampton Roads area, represented by the ILA, 
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struck for better wages. That would be their only strike in the years of 
1920-1935, but throughout those years, the longshoremen would see 
their wages increase to the point where in 1934 they earned double 
what other longshoremen in the area earned. This paper will take a 
look at how the ILA was covered by the Virginian Pilot and the Nor-
folk Journal and Guide during the years of 1920-1935, and show that 
while the Journal and Guide’s coverage remained favorable, the Vir-
ginian Pilot’s coverage of the ILA in the Hampton Roads area gradu-
ally went from negative, to neutral, to favorable, when the union 
proved to be conservative and good for business.
 Three key events took place between 1920 and 1935 that 
will be used to compare the two papers, and show how the Virginian 
Pilot’s view of the ILA changed during that time. In the midst of the 
first event, the strike of 1923, the Virginian Pilot presented the ILA 
in a negative light. In 1931, during wage negotiations, when the ILA 
had proved that it operated in a conservative manner, the Virginian 
Pilot was neutral in its reports. Then in 1934, the MWIU, a radical 
union with ties to communism, emerged in the Hampton Roads area. 
When longshoremen of the MWIU demanded higher wages, the ILA 
used the strength of its union to put an end to their strike. In doing 
so, the ILA showed that their union was beneficial to the shipping 
industry, and this showed in the Virginian Pilot when the paper be-
gan to write favorably of it. Throughout these events, the Journal 
and Guide’s coverage of the ILA remained favorable, even when the 
MWIU emerged in Hampton Roads. Even though the MWIU rep-
resented black longshoremen in Norfolk and Newport News, it was 
alleged in the Pilot and Journal and Guide that they were associated 
with the Communist Party. P.B. Young, who was the owner and edi-
tor of the Norfolk Journal and Guide, expressed that African Ameri-
cans should not use the Communist Party, but rather, find “safer and 
saner” ways to achieve advancements.10
1923: Members of the ILA in Hampton Roads Go on Strike
It was roughly 12:00 pm on October 6, 1923, when unionized 
longshoremen in Norfolk and Newport News walked out on their 
jobs after failed negotiations of a new wage scale. The longshoremen 
were offered 75 cents an hour for straight time and $1.07 for over 
time, holidays, and weekend pay. The new offer was 10 cents more 
than the longshoremen’s previous contract, but the workers were not 
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satisfied. Since the acceptance of Hampton Roads’ longshoremen 
into the ILA, they had always been paid five cents an hour less than 
the workers of the North-Atlantic ports they were associated with, 
and when the five cent differential was not abolished in the new wage 
agreements, the 2,500 longshoremen of Norfolk and Newport News 
walked off their jobs and went on strike.11 The Norfolk Journal and 
Guide and the Virginian Pilot took opposing sides when covering the 
strike. The Journal and Guide’s support of the longshoremen was 
more visible compared to support the Virginian Pilot showed for the 
shipping lines. The segregation of the Hampton Roads work force 
meant that the longshoremen in the area were mostly African Ameri-
can, and their affiliation with the ILA meant that they were black 
workers associated in a primarily white union. Although race was 
never mentioned by the Norfolk Journal and Guide, it would have 
been important for the writers at an African-American paper to prove 
that an all-black union could succeed, and to ensure that the African-
American longshoremen received the same wage as the white long-
shoremen working in other ports. Likewise, the Virginian Pilot was 
pro-business, which explains why the paper’s coverage favored the 
shipping lines. Also, it was catered to a white audience, which meant 
that supporting an all-black union that wanted to be paid the same 
as whites would have been bad for business. Although the Virginian 
Pilot’s bias was slightly more subtle than the Norfolk Journal and 
Guide’s, the headlines and articles of both papers left little to the 
imagination as to where each paper’s support lied.12
The papers did report both sides of the dispute; however, 
each paper’s articles were heavily slanted to favor one side over the 
other. One way that they did this was to present information and 
then to follow it up by quoting an official, either representing the 
shipping lines or the union. When the Journal and Guide reported 
on rumors of strikers giving in and going back to work, they gave 
the union’s Third Vice President, George Milner, the last word when 
they quoted him as saying, “we are standing just as we walked out…
every man is loyal to the principles of organized labor.”13 The Pilot 
used the same tactic. When the paper reported that the shipping lines 
denied the Union Official’s request for a meeting, the Pilot ended 
the article with a three-paragraph quote from the shipping lines as to 
why the meeting was denied. In some cases, this made their support 
of one side subtler, but by leaving out important information, it likely 
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caused readers to have different views as to who was right in the 
argument. For example, whenever the Pilot explained why the long-
shoremen went on strike, it was said that they were rejecting a 10-
cent increase in their hourly wage, or that they “demanded 80 cents 
an hour.”14 While the statements were true, they were worded in a 
way that demonized the longshoremen and did not present the whole 
side of the argument. Not realizing that the longshoremen were strik-
ing for equal pay, readers of the Virginian Pilot likely thought that 
the strikers were unreasonable for not accepting the 10-cent wage 
increase. Subscribers to the Journal and Guide were encouraged to 
view the longshoremen differently. Readers likely thought the long-
shoremen were justified in their demands when they read: “There 
has been some dissatisfaction among members of the International 
Longshoremen’s Union of the port of Hampton Roads for some time 
on account of the preferential enjoyed by longshoremen of the ports 
of New York and Boston engaged in similar work and affiliated with 
the same organization.”15 In case there was any doubt that the wage 
gap was unjustified, the Norfolk Journal and Guide went further and 
explained that the difference in cost of living of cities like New York 
and Boston did not warrant the wage differential.16 This assertion by 
Young’s paper was probably more hopeful than thoughtful, because, 
even then, living costs were higher in North Eastern cities than in 
Southern ports.
The articles not only had an effect on the opinions of outsid-
ers reading about the strike, but the morale of the strikers themselves 
likely depended upon which paper that they read. On the first day of 
the Virginian Pilot’s coverage of the strike, their headline read, “Su-
perabundance of Unemployed Workers Counteracts Effects of Strike 
here, Shipping Conditions Practically Normal.” The paper went on 
to say that, not only had the shipping lines found enough workers 
to load and unload the ships, they were doing it for the old wage of 
65 cents an hour.17 In its later articles, the Pilot went further when it 
said that they had so many workers who wanted to work for the old 
wage that they had to turn many away.18 Any striker that read this 
probably felt that their cause was hopeless. But if their morale was 
weakened when they read the Pilot’s articles, then their spirits might 
have been lifted when they read what was written in the Norfolk 
Journal and Guide. The Journal and Guide’s headlines contradicted 
the Pilot’s by saying “2,000 men hold out for demands, Ship sailings 
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delayed.”19 Nowhere in the paper’s coverage did it mention that non-
union workers were working for the old wage. 
Given that the two papers were divided by race, and that the 
longshoremen were African-American, it is surprising that race did 
not play a large role in the coverage of either paper. Maybe it was 
understood at the time and did not need to be said, but when the 
Journal and Guide mentioned that the longshoremen went on strike 
because they wanted to be paid the same as the workers in the other 
ports, they did not mention that the workers in the other ports were 
primarily white, and the pay inequality could have been based on 
race. The paper’s status as a southern black publication meant it had 
to be calculated in the way it covered racial issues.20 The one instance 
when race was mentioned happened in the Virginian Pilot on the 
fourth day, when the strike turned violent.
It was approximately 5:00 pm on October 10, 1923, when 
shots were fired on the corner of Hampton Boulevard and Titustown. 
Although non-union workers were called in to break the strike, the 
ILA urged the longshoremen to keep the strike peaceful, but on the 
fourth day of the strike a group of strikebreakers were shot at as they 
were heading home from a day of unloading ships at the army base. 
The event left one man dead and another injured.21 
When comparing the coverage of the shooting, two key dif-
ferences stood out. The Virginian Pilot’s coverage emphasized race 
wherever possible, while race was hardly mentioned in the Norfolk 
Journal and Guide. There was also a difference in writing style. The 
Virginian Pilot’s story was over-sensationalized, especially when 
compared to the version printed in the Journal and Guide.
The racism of the early 20th century is evident in the Vir-
ginian Pilot’s coverage of the shooting. The author let the reader 
know, in almost every instance, when an individual that was men-
tioned was black. If a white person was being described, Captain 
J.A. Rawls for example, their name was all that was used to describe 
them, but William H. Ashley is described as William H. Ashley, col-
ored. The race of an individual did not appear once in the Norfolk 
Journal and Guide, but it appeared twelve times in the Virginian 
Pilot’s article.22 But the fact that race was used so heavily in the Pi-
lot’s article is not as important as how it was used. While the Journal 
and Guide described the shooters as “the occupants who opened fire 
on the truck,” the Virginian Pilot called them “the negroes who fired 
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upon the truck,” and then shortens it to just “the Negroes.”23 It is just 
speculation to say why the Pilot chose to cover the story the manner 
in which they did. Nevertheless, the paper was known for being pro-
business, and emphasizing that the shooters were black could have 
been a tactic to deter the public’s support of the strikers. The fact that 
the paper exaggerated the number of “negroes” doing the shooting 
supports this theory.
The writing styles of the two papers could not be more dif-
ferent in their coverage of the shooting. The Virginian Pilot’s article 
on the shooting was over-sensationalized, and in some cases exag-
gerated, while the Journal and Guide’s version of the shooting was 
a bland but seemingly accurate story. The reason behind this was the 
Journal and Guide wanted to expand its readership and, at the same 
time, work towards racial equality. Since it was a black publication 
in the south, the paper had to walk a fine line in order to appeal to 
a broader base.24 As a result, the Journal and Guide’s report of the 
shooting was short and to the point. It stated that a car with about 
“four or five occupants” opened fire on a truckload of strikebreakers 
on the corner of Hampton Boulevard and Titustown, one person died 
and another was injured, and that the police raided the ILA head-
quarters shortly after but no arrests were made. In an attempt to sell 
more papers, the Virginian Pilot’s version exaggerated the amount of 
shooters, saying “ten or more negroes” opened fire on the truck that 
was carrying strike breakers. The paper also reported misleading and 
irrelevant information, such as the initial reports were that three po-
lice officers had been killed when in fact no police officers were shot. 
The paper went on to describe how three detectives commandeered a 
vehicle and eventually chased after four suspects but no arrests were 
made—which was also information that was not found in the Journal 
and Guide’s report.25
Two weeks into the strike, it looked like neither side would 
be able to come to an agreement. The shipping lines took their offer 
of 75 cents an hour off the table, and went further when they stated 
that a deal would not be made unless the ILA no longer represented 
the longshoremen. In the end, the Federal Government was called in, 
and the United States Shipping Board negotiated what was claimed 
to be a victory by both sides. The Longshoremen’s wage of 80 cents 
was rejected, the 75-cent an hour rate was set in place, and the ILA 
was granted the right to be the official bargaining agent of the long-
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shoremen.26
Both the Virginian Pilot and the Norfolk Journal and Guide 
had reasons for printing the story of the strike and the shooting in 
the way that they did. The Virginian Pilot wanted to sell papers, so 
they used yellow journalism tactics to sensationalize the story.27 The 
paper was pro-business, which meant that there was a motive to dis-
courage the strikers. The paper wrote that not only were unorganized 
laborers working for the old wage of 65 cents, but so many people 
were willing to work for that wage that workers were turned away. 
The paper also used race to make the people involved in the strike 
seem different and unworthy of the public’s support. On the other 
hand, because of the class and race of the striking longshoremen, it 
was in the Norfolk Journal and Guide’s interest to support the long-
shoremen. They did so by reporting that the strikers were determined 
to continue the fight, were not responsible for the shooting, and that 
the ships were not being loaded on schedule. The paper’s location in 
the South meant that, since it was a black publication, then it was not 
in its best interest to use sensationalizing tactics, or place an empha-
sis on race in its writings. 
It was not until 1927 that the longshoremen of Norfolk and 
Newport News would receive the 80 cents an hour that they struck 
for in 1923, but just like the circumstances of the 1923 strike, the 
local longshoremen’s pay was five cents less than the other North At-
lantic ports.28 The Journal and Guide reported on the wage increase 
but did not mention that the five-cent differential still remained. It ap-
peared that the ILA had the longshoremen under control. There was 
no fuss from the longshoremen, and the Journal and Guide wrote 
that “harmonious relations exist between the ILA and employers.”29 
The Virginian Pilot did not report on the wage increase. For the next 
four years, their wages remained the same, and the ILA continued 
their policy of cooperation. 
Things changed in 1929; the Great Depression began and 
had a decade-long impact on the economy of the United States. The 
“Roaring Twenties” came to an end when the stock market crashed 
on October 29th, 1929. Large numbers of banks and businesses 
closed. Industrial production fell by 50 percent, and many employees 
were laid off.30 For example, the Ford Motor Company had 128,000 
workers, and by 1931 they had laid off 91,000 people, leaving them 
with a total of 37,000 workers.31 All over the country, workers wages 
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were drastically slashed, and most considered themselves lucky to be 
employed and did not protest. The Encyclopedia of Virginia stated 
that the effects of the Depression were not felt as hard in Virginia, al-
though the state wasn’t “depression proof.” Virginia produced many 
goods that the nation’s poor could afford, like cigarettes, food, and 
clothing, which meant that the state was able to bounce back from 
depression sooner than other states.32
1931: Strike Averted
In 1931, near the end of September, it was time for the ship-
ping lines and the longshoremen to negotiate their contracts for the 
following year. Industries all over the United States were cutting the 
wages of their employees as a result of the economic collapse in the 
country. Going into the negotiations, the longshoremen were earning 
a wage of 80 cents an hour straight time, $2.60 during meal times, 
and $1.30 for overtime—which went into effect after 44 hours, and 
included the weekends and holidays. Union officials were in charge 
of how many workers were assigned to load and unload each ship. 
The new contract that the shipping lines proposed sought to cut the 
workers wages to 65 cents straight time and $1.00 for overtime, in-
crease the work week from 44 to 48 hours, eliminate overtime pay for 
weekends, and eliminate double-time pay for working during meal 
times. The differences in their demands were drastic, and the long-
shoremen declared if their terms were not met, they would strike.33
Just as they did in the strike of 1923, the Norfolk Journal and 
Guide advocated for the longshoremen. They did present both sides 
of the dispute; however, union officials were always given the last 
word any time that they reported on a claim made by the shipping 
lines. In a change to their reporting on the 1923 strike, the Virginian 
Pilot, for the most part, left their opinion out of their coverage of the 
negotiation process. They did once give the final say to the shipping 
lines over one claim made by Union Officials, but that was the only 
instance (to be discussed below) where it appeared that the paper 
favored one side over the other.
In the paper’s initial report, the Journal and Guide wrote 
that the shipping lines sought to cut the wages of the longshoremen, 
and if that were to happen, the longshoremen would strike. Unlike 
the strike of 1923, the Journal and Guide presented their readers 
with a lengthy quote from an official of the shipping lines, which al-
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lowed them to give reasoning for their stance, and why they thought 
the cut in wages was fair. Mr. Toppin, representing one of the major 
shipping lines stated that the longshoremen were earning 30 cents an 
hour in 1912, before the First World War, when “general world con-
ditions might have been considered normal.” By 1931 their wages 
had increased to 85 cents an hour (he was referring to wage workers 
earned in the North-Atlantic ports; Hampton Road’s longshoremen 
still suffered from the five cent wage differential, which meant that 
they were earning 80 cents an hour), which was nearly a 200 percent 
increase. Mr. Toppin stated that the cost of living since 1912 had 
risen by 60 percent, which meant that the longshoremen should have 
been earning no more than 60 cents an hour.34 His math was a little 
off; a 60 percent increase from 30 cents would equal 48 cents, but 
his point remained the same. His view was, given the fact that the 
longshoremen’s wages had increased so much since 1912, a 15-cent 
cut in their rates was not as drastic as it sounded, especially given the 
circumstances of the economy. The Journal and Guide gave the last 
word to the ILA when they allowed the union’s President, Joseph P. 
Ryan to respond to the claim made by Mr. Toppin. Joseph Ryan’s 
response was that the wage longshoremen earned in 1912 was not 
a decent wage, and “conditions were such at that time that the men 
had no alternative but to accept that scale.”35 Giving the last word to 
a union official indicated which side the Journal and Guide favored 
in the dispute, but the paper made its stance on the issue clearer the 
following week, when it went into greater detail as to why the long-
shoremen should not receive a cut to their wages.
After the first meeting between the Union Officials and rep-
resentatives of the shipping lines, it looked as if there would be no 
way to avoid a strike. The Journal and Guide’s second article made 
a reasonable argument in favor of the longshoremen. 
The publishers of the paper probably understood that the mas-
sive unemployment caused by the depression might have made read-
ers unsympathetic to the longshoremen’s demands, which explains 
why the author was diplomatic in his defense for the longshoremen. 
The article mentioned that when other industries attempted maintain 
the rates they paid to employees, the result was a massive layoff, 
which made the unemployment problem worse. The author went fur-
ther by explaining that those industries then decided to cut worker’s 
wages so that more men would be able to work, and in every case 
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those workers did not threaten to strike. But according to the Jour-
nal and Guide, the longshoremen’s dilemma was different. It was 
stated that, although the wage they were earning was high, few of the 
longshoremen worked a full week, and their average weekly salary 
was $15.36 Given the rate the workers were earning, $15 dollars a 
week meant that the average worker was working roughly 17 hours 
a week. So although their wages were higher than workers in other 
industries on paper, in reality, the longshoremen were earning much 
less than they appeared to earn. The weekly salary was the major 
grievance that the longshoreman had in regards to their wages being 
cut. The fact that Journal and Guide wrote “there is great merit to the 
contentions which have been raised by the longshoremen” showed 
that the paper favored the longshoremen over the shipping lines. The 
Virginian Pilot, on the other hand, appeared to be neutral throughout 
the dispute, except for one instance.
The Pilot’s report of the dispute between the ILA and the 
shipping lines was noticeably different than the paper’s coverage of 
the 1923 strike. There were no eye-popping headlines that would 
have led the reader to favor one side over the other. The sentences 
were not phrased in a way that would have made the longshoremen 
seem greedy or unreasonable. Instead, the paper stated what each 
side offered, and updated the reader, each day, on how the negotia-
tions went. The only time the Pilot appeared to favor the shipping 
lines was in its September 26th article, in which the headline read: 
“Longshoremen’s Strike Looming Over Wage Cuts.” In the article, 
the longshoremen’s main argument of only earning $15 dollars a 
week was presented. The last word was given to the shipping lines 
when it reported that the ship owners could not understand Ryan’s 
claim, when the longshoremen were paid 85 cents an hour, and guar-
anteed “at least half a days pay if they worked one hour in loading 
or unloading ships.” It did point to the paper’s bias when it gave the 
shipping lines the final word over the longshoremen’s major argu-
ment against wage cuts, but it was the only instance where the ship-
ping lines received favor. The depression caused extreme unemploy-
ment, and workers in almost all industries were accepting wage cuts 
in order to not be laid off. It would have been easy for the Virginian 
Pilot to demonize the longshoremen for threatening to strike at a 
time when most people consider themselves lucky for having a job. 
So, what changed between 1923 and 1931 that made the Vir-
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ginian Pilot’s coverage of the ILA so different when compared to the 
strike of the previous decade? The Pilot was a pro-business paper, so 
it would be reasonable to suspect that the paper would have favored 
heavily on the side of the shipping lines—especially when it would 
have been easy to do so. The most likely reason for this was the fact 
that the ILA had proved itself to be an anti-radical union. The Jour-
nal and Guide gave weight to this claim when it quoted Joseph Ryan 
as saying “our men have put their brains and brawn into the steam 
ship business, and have successfully fought to keep communist, radi-
cals, the I.W.W. and the like out of the game.”37 Union officials were 
often accused of being in collusion with the shipping lines. So, in 
a way, the ILA was good for business. Even though the longshore-
men’s wages increased nearly every year, the alternative could have 
been much worse for the shipping lines. The union maintained the 
status quo, which the Pilot pointed out when it wrote that “there has 
been no strike of longshoremen for a number of years in Norfolk or 
Newport News.”38
1934: The Emergence of a Radical Union
Since the emergence of the ILA in the Hampton Roads area, 
the union received favorable coverage from the Norfolk Journal 
and Guide. From 1920 to 1930, the Virginian Pilot’s coverage of 
the union seemed to have transitioned from hostile to neutral. But in 
1934, the emergence of a second, and more radical longshoremen’s 
union would turn the Pilot’s coverage of the ILA from neutral to 
favorable.
The ILA’s policy of cooperation with the shipping lines al-
lowed for some dockworkers to feel that the union officials were too 
cozy with the shipping lines. In 1934 that argument was made by lo-
cal longshoremen who joined the Marine Workers Industrial Union 
(MWIU).39 The leader of the local MWIU was Alexander Wright, 
who was a spokesperson for the Communist Party, and although 
union representatives denied that it was a communist organization, 
both the Pilot and Journal and Guide made multiple allegations of 
the MWIU’s ties to communism.
Longshoremen not affiliated with the ILA had reason to pro-
test; their hourly wage was 40 cents an hour, which was half the 
rate the ILA longshoremen earned.40 The MWIU made its demands 
on April 30th, 1934, which included a wage increase to 60 cents an 
51
et al.: JBHR, Vol. 5
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014
52 Spring 2014JameS Blair HiStorical review
hour. When the time to meet their demands expired, roughly 350 
longshoremen in the Hampton Roads area went on strike.41
The Virginian Pilot’s coverage of the MWIU strike was 
very similar to its reports of the 1923 ILA strike. It discouraged the 
strikers by writing how little the shipping industry was affected and 
how many workers showed up to work at the wage that the striking 
longshoremen were not satisfied with. The Pilot went further with 
an article that denounced the merits of the striking longshoremen. 
The article mentioned that the MWIU was “less conservatively led 
and advised” than the ILA, and went on to say that their strike was 
“ill-timed and ill-advised” and that “common sense took a vacation” 
when the officials made their demands.42 
Throughout the strike, the Pilot repeatedly reported that the 
ILA was not involved, and spoke favorably of the union. In doing 
so, the Pilot’s reporting of the ILA went from neutral to positive. 
During the ordeal, the ILA proved why they were worthy of the fa-
vorable light that the paper was beginning to portray them in. The 
Pilot quoted the Third Vice President of the ILA, George Milner in 
saying he was willing to “throw every single one of its members into 
the breach so that shipping would not be affected by the strike.”43 
Milner’s remarks proved just how beneficial the union had become 
to the shipping industry. Not only had the union kept its members 
in line by not allowing a strike in the area in 11 years, the union 
was now using its members to break strikes and prevent any radical 
unions from seeing the light of day. As a result, the MWIU’s strike 
ended a few days after it began, with none of their demands met. A 
few months later, the union was non-existent in the area.44 
Later that year, the ILA would be rewarded for the role they 
played in breaking up the strike of the MWIU. After negotiations, 
longshoremen represented by the ILA received a pay increase of 
10 cents an hour. The Journal and Guide again reported that “rela-
tions between the laborers and employers are very harmonious.”45 
ILA members in Norfolk and Newport News had come a long way 
since their strike in 1923. In 1922, the longshoremen were earning 
65 cents an hour, and by the end of 1934 their wage had increased 
to 90 cents an hour. There was a negative side to the advancements 
that they made. Their wages and working conditions had improved, 
but those advancements were only shared by members of the ILA. 
Other longshoremen in the area were paid half of what the ILA mem-
52
James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 5 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol5/iss1/1
Wash Longshoremen’s association 53
bers earned. The strength of their union meant that a strike of long-
shoremen could not be successful without their participation, but as 
shown in the MWIU strike, they were not willing to participate and 
even volunteered to use their men to break strikes. This showed that 
the ILA not only kept its members in line—there had not been an 
ILA strike in Hampton Roads since 1923—but by preventing other 
strikes from being successful, they kept all longshoremen, includ-
ing those not represented by their union, in line. This meant that the 
union was good for business and explains why the Virginian Pilot, 
a pro-business paper, changed its stance on the ILA. In the strike of 
1923, when it was unclear what role the ILA would play in this area, 
the Pilot covered the union negatively. In 1931, when the ILA acted 
conservatively, the paper was neutral in its coverage of the union. 
Finally, in 1934 when the ILA showed that they were beneficial to 
the shipping industry, the Pilot spoke highly of the union. During 
the same time period, the Journal and Guide’s support for the ILA 
never wavered. The paper advocated for the union in every dispute 
and wage negotiation that took place. The conservative nature of 
the ILA was beneficial to the Journal and Guide’s pursuit of racial 
equality. The ILA improved the wages and working conditions of 
black longshoremen in the Hampton Roads area, and although this 
meant that other black workers suffered because of their success, 
they were working towards equality in a way that the Journal and 
Guide’s owner, P.B. Young considered “safe and sane.”46 In other 
words, the ILA had become part of Tidewater’s establishment, both 
black and white.
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a CyCle of revenge: 
A Guerilla Warfare and Union Policies in the Border States, 
1861-1865
 Sabrina Manfield, The College of William & Mary
 Pulling out his pistol, Confederate guerrilla Joseph M. Bai-
ley fired at a Federal raider, intent on murdering him. At that same 
moment, the man desperately declared his wish to surrender and fell 
to the ground. Bailey believed he had killed him; however, the cap 
of his pistol was caught inside the round pipe of the gun. The man 
suddenly jumped to his feet and began to run. Bailey quickly caught 
up to him, seething with fury and prepared to shoot him again. As 
he ran, the man collapsed, begging Bailey for mercy. He announced 
that his wife was dead, and he had five small children at home who 
needed him. After hearing that appeal, Bailey’s desire to kill the man 
evaporated, and the Federal raider extended his hand to him. Bailey 
recalled, “I took the proffered hand and freely confess that in spite of 
my greatest effort, sympathetic tears trickled down my cheeks. Such 
is the fickleness of the human heart. One moment ready to commit 
atrocities and the next melting with tenderness.”1 Even when writing 
his memoir, this moment still resonated lucidly with Bailey.
 While Civil War guerrillas were responsible for some of the 
most cutthroat killings in American history, Bailey’s story reveals 
that they were still capable of showing mercy. Regardless of the 
guerrillas’ true motivations, the Union army perceived them to be 
uncontrollable and brutal. These negative perceptions influenced the 
Union to develop stringent policies against the Confederate guer-
rillas; as a result, the guerrillas ruthlessly sought retaliation against 
the Federals. Ultimately, the vengeful relationship between the two 
forces infiltrated and destroyed the lives of innocent civilians.
 Historian Stephen Ash articulates, “Clearly, guerrillaism was 
a masculine phenomenon representing, at least in part, the defense 
of personal honor against the degrading tyranny of Federal rule.”2 
Taking Ash’s argument a step further, this paper assesses both the 
concept of personal honor and of revenge as they relate to guerrilla 
warfare. While guerrillas wanted to protect their own manhood, they 
were largely driven by injuries that were inflicted upon their families 
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and their communities. In addition, Historian Daniel E. Sutherland 
argues, “Confederate guerrillas influenced the military policies of 
both sides. Rebel irregulars also helped their nation lose the war.”3 In 
Sutherland’s book, A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerril-
las in the American Civil War, he provides insightful analysis about 
the relationship between guerrillas, Union policy, and Confederate 
morale. This paper conducts a detailed examination of Union poli-
cies and establishes a causal relationship between the undertakings 
of the Union army and the actions of the Confederate guerrillas. This 
essay uses letters, newspapers, memoirs, and the established argu-
ments of historians to put forth a comprehensive explanation of the 
connection between the actions of the Confederate irregulars and the 
policies of the Union army.
 The use of irregular warfare during the Civil War began with 
an incident in Baltimore, Maryland, on April 19, 1861. The Sixth 
Massachusetts regiment had come to take control of the city in order 
to protect the border of Washington, D.C., the capital of the United 
States.  In addition to sending troops to Maryland, Lincoln also at-
tempted to enlist Marylanders into the Union Army. These two fac-
tors caused the city of Baltimore’s support for the Union cause to 
plummet. As the Sixth Massachusetts regiment marched through the 
city, soldiers were shot, pegged with bricks, and hit by stones.4 The 
author of an editorial in the Boston Daily Advertiser stated that the 
regiment “was attacked by lawless men and boys, with stones, brick-
bats and firearms…The attack was disgraceful, and was not partici-
pated in by any Union man, or upholder of the laws of this country.”5 
As this article suggests, the conflict in Baltimore instigated tensions 
between the Union army and irregular raiders. The U.S. government 
subdued the chaos, but the atmosphere of dissent in Maryland had 
been established.  
 While most Maryland secessionists left the state to join the 
Confederate army, a small number remained in order to wreak havoc 
on the Unionists. The Confederate sympathizers acted as spies in 
Federal camps, concocting plans to kidnap Union officials and raid-
ers. The conflict in Baltimore inspired similar instances of violence 
throughout the Border States over the remainder of the Civil War. 
Most significantly, after the initial irregular activity in Baltimore, the 
infliction of revenge became routine; as a consequence, there were 
often instances of “violence against those who retaliated.”6 This 
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nasty cycle of revenge defined the relationship between Confederate 
guerrillas and the Unionists throughout the Civil War.
 Following the incident in Baltimore, widespread support for 
guerrilla warfare emerged throughout the Confederacy. Confederate 
leaders such as Virginia lawyer and polemicist George Fitzhugh an-
ticipated that the war was about to take a violent turn. In early 1862, 
he argued that if the Union infiltrated the interior of the South, the na-
tion’s “chief reliance…must be on irregular troops and partisan war-
fare.”7 In addition to the endorsements of respected figures such as 
Fitzhugh, the civilians of the Confederacy were strongly influenced 
by the words of the press. In May of 1862, The Semi-Weekly Raleigh 
Register, which was based in Raleigh, North Carolina, released an 
article advocating for civilians to join partisan bands. The article em-
phasized that partisan rangers would be much more beneficial to the 
Confederate cause than “a regiment of undisciplined” soldiers.8 The 
piece also stated that as partisans, they would not have to “chafe un-
der the restraints and dull monotony of camp life, but lead a life full 
of adventure and excitement.”9 The ideas propagated by the press 
matched the desires of Confederate citizens, who wanted to contrib-
ute to the war cause while remaining in charge of their own actions.
 While many Confederate leaders doubted the reliability and 
loyalty of partisans, the Confederate army decided to use irregular 
warfare because it produced quick results. The Confederate army 
used a variety of tactics in order to control Union invaders, but the 
threat of guerrilla violence was the most efficient way to deter intrud-
ers.10 On April 16, 1862, the Confederacy passed the First Conscrip-
tion Act, which called all white men from the ages of eighteen to 
thirty-five into service. Five days later, on April 21, the Confederate 
Congress passed the Partisan Ranger Act (PRA), which officially al-
lowed irregular groups to be formed with the President’s approval. 
Inspired by images of mystery, freedom, and adventure, thousands 
of Confederate civilians became partisan rangers or joined guerrilla 
bands.11
  While guerrillas and partisan rangers each participated in 
forms of irregular warfare, it is important to examine the differences 
between these two types of fighters.  In theory, partisan rangers were 
supposed to be subjected to all of the same treatment and rules as Con-
federate soldiers. The Confederate army also compensated them for 
their actions, but they were only paid for “subsistence and forage.”12 
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Partisans also served as a defensive support system for the Confed-
eracy. This type of fighting “legitimized the sort of free-wheeling 
operations” that many Confederates preferred to more structured 
kinds of warfare.13 On the other hand, rebel guerrillas were outlaws, 
who acted completely independently of the government. As historian 
Leo Huff stated, guerrillas were “troops not belonging to a regular 
army” who employed tactics such as “raids, extortion, destruction 
and massacre…They were peculiarly dangerous.”14 Guerrillas were 
known for their unmatched ruthlessness, their elusiveness, and their 
cunning.
 In spite of their differences, guerrillas and partisans gener-
ally had one important motivation in common: they wanted to fight 
for their own communities.15 Many men in the Confederate army 
were sent away from their families, but independent partisan groups 
almost always remained close to their homes. Another common 
thread that connected both groups was the desire for retaliation.  Par-
tisan rangers and even members of the regular army often breached 
the restrictions of standard warfare in order to avenge their family 
and friends.16 The most significant difference between partisans and 
guerrillas was the latter group’s focus on the infliction of fear. Daniel 
Sutherland articulated, “Guerrilla strategy…recognized terrorization 
of civilians as a legitimate goal. Unfortunately the best method of 
achieving the goal of terror was, likewise, terror.” While the two 
groups were similar, the goal to infuse their victims with horror was 
unique to the guerrilla culture, and it differentiated them from parti-
san warriors.
 In the summer of 1862, the nature of the Civil War trans-
formed. After General George B. McClellan conducted an unsuc-
cessful attempt to seize Richmond, the Union started to employ new 
tactics.17 A major turning point in the relationship between the guer-
rillas and the Union army occurred on August 13th.  A large brick 
building, which was located on 1409 Grand Avenue in Kansas City, 
Missouri, collapsed.  Thomas J. Ewing, the Union Army general 
from Kansas, had been using the building as a prison for Southern 
women and girls, who had been accused of serving as spies for the 
Confederacy.  The collapse killed and injured several sisters of guer-
rilla Bill Anderson, and it was rumored that Ewing had engineered 
the collapse.18  Historian Richard S. Brown argued that the collapse 
contributed to rise of guerrilla activity during the war.  He claimed 
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that the tragedy “tore the last thin covering of mercy from the hearts 
of Quantrill’s boys.”19 Though the incident was likely an unfortunate 
accident, it fueled guerrillas with a powerful desire for revenge.
 The summer of 1862 was also significant because the Feder-
als began utilizing a strategy of “hard war” and moving away from 
their traditionally conciliatory policy.20 Only five days after the col-
lapse of the Kansas City prison, General Thomas Ewing issued Or-
der No. 10, which established the Union’s aggressive policy toward 
guerrilla warfare. The order proclaimed, “Officers will arrest and 
send to the district provost-marshal for punishment, all men…who 
willfully aid and encourage guerrillas, with a written statement…of 
the proof against them.”21 Ewing specified that the marshals would 
attempt to determine which guerrillas were coerced to act against 
the Union and which ones were genuinely disloyal; however, it was 
difficult to make these distinctions without knowledge of the guerril-
las’ thoughts. This lack of clarity resulted in the tragic execution of 
many innocent citizens, who had been accused of guerrilla activity. 
Most significantly, the order specifically stated that the “wives and 
children of known guerrillas…will be notified by such officers to 
move out of this district….”22 Clearly, this provision indicated that 
the family members of guerrillas were going to be required to leave 
their homes. The combination of the collapse of the prison and Order 
No. 10 infused many guerrillas with fury, inspiring them to act more 
violently and ruthlessly.
 While the Union’s transition away from conciliation inspired 
an increase in irregular warfare, in turn, the upsurge in guerrilla ac-
tivity caused the Union to further harshen their attitudes towards un-
regulated actions. In the summer of 1862, Union General William T. 
Sherman declared, “All the people are now guerrillas.”23 Despite the 
fact that not all Confederate civilians were actually guerrillas, the 
actions of the Union army often reflected Sherman’s philosophy. The 
Federals killed Confederate band member John L. Owen because he 
was accused of bushwhacking.24 In the words of Worthington Davis, 
a veteran campaigner in Kentucky and Tennessee, “The bushwhack-
er was not a soldier but a cowardly, contemptible individual, who 
never carried out hostilities unless he was unopposed…At night he 
could be found lying in ambush to kill some unwary victim simply 
for the plunder.”25 While guerrillas made up only a small number of 
irregular fighters, partisans and guerrillas were commonly accused 
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of bushwhacking. In reality, Owen served in a group of sanctioned 
partisan rangers. His wife, Nancy Owen, articulated, “I do know and 
can say with truth that he never engaged in what is termed bush-
whacking….”26 After six months of spying on him, the Federals in-
vaded Owen’s home.  Nancy Owen recounted, “They made him sit 
down on a log which lay close to a fence…and there took the life of 
an innocent, unresisting man. They left him, there on the public road, 
shot down like a wild beast.”27 It was incidents like this that inspired 
guerrillas to seek revenge. Owen was a sanctioned partisan ranger, 
and in the absence of proof, he was brutally murdered. Clearly, the 
Union at times failed to successfully differentiate between partisans 
and rebel guerrillas. 
 As the tragic story of John L. Owen reveals, it was often 
difficult to distinguish between partisan rangers, guerrillas, and even 
Union soldiers. As a consequence, seeking revenge was a challenge 
and sometimes the wrong people were hurt or killed. This confusion 
had a significant impact on the civilians. For example, it was impos-
sible to know whether a person’s clothing reflected his true identity. 
According to Thomas A. Peters, a citizen of Bolivar, Missouri, “Ci-
vilians were terrorized by this uncertainty; caught in the middle of 
a chaotic struggle, they could never assume that the stranger at the 
gate—whom in peacetime they would have made welcome—was 
not their despoiler or even their killer.”28 This uncertainty created a 
wave of paranoia throughout the Border States. The Union soldiers 
used this panic and ambiguity to their advantage. They would rob the 
homes of innocent civilians, but they would not wear their uniforms; 
as a result, the people mistook them for bushwhackers, and their ac-
tions were not traced back to the Union army. This fluidity between 
guerrillas and Union soldiers pervaded the Confederate civilians 
with a feeling of perpetual fear.
 The subject of appearances led to intense conflicts over the 
issue of dealing with imprisoned partisans. During the summer of 
1862, commanders of both sides argued vigorously about “the rela-
tionship of irregular and semi-regular troops to regular forces, and 
the proper treatment of captured partisans.”29 In a letter exchange 
between Thomas Hindman, a Congressman and Major General from 
Arkansas, and William T. Sherman, Sherman argued that those who 
fought without uniforms should not anticipate receiving the same 
punishments as soldiers.30 Most Union commanders treated guerril-
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las and partisans in the same way because neither of them were regu-
lar soldiers. Alexander Walker, a prisoner of the Union Army, wrote 
in a letter to Confederate President Jefferson Davis, “A number of 
our citizens enrolled as partisan rangers or in the State militia have 
been closely imprisoned and threatened with death as guerrillas or 
pirates.” While rangers acted legally under the orders of the Confed-
eracy, the Union often deliberately ignored the Confederacy’s policy 
on partisan warfare. This defiance contributed to the heated conflict 
between the Union army and Confederate irregulars.
 Towards the end of 1862, the Union began emulating the 
methods of Confederate guerrillas. The aforementioned prisoner, 
Alexander Walker, wrote in a letter to Jefferson Davis about the vil-
lainous nature of General Benjamin Butler. Walker articulated, “The 
malice of Butler against females is more bitter and insatiable than 
that against males…And this is but a feeble and deficient present-
ment of the enormities and brutalities of this cowardly and brutal 
monster.”31 Especially following 1863, the Union soldiers grew in-
creasingly undisciplined, harming innocent communities.32 Historian 
Michael Fellman articulates, “Lawlessness was not true of all regi-
ments, but it was far more characteristic than post-war regimental 
histories suggest.”33 Troops in border-towns scoured the countryside 
searching for guerrillas, and they believed that “all Missourians were 
by nature traitors.”34 While guerrillas presented a dangerous threat 
to the civilian populations in the Border States, the actions of Union 
troops proved to have equally as malignant effects on border com-
munities.
 The confusion that defined guerrilla warfare in 1862 resulted 
in the creation of an official Federal policy towards irregular war-
riors.  Henry W. Halleck, who was the U.S. Army General-in-Chief, 
created a system to help differentiate among the diverse types of ir-
regulars. The policy, which passed on April 24, 1863, was called War 
Department General Order No. 100, and it separated these fighters 
into four sections. 35 The “partisan” was awarded the designation of a 
soldier; however, insurgents, brigands, and the guerrilla proper were 
all deemed to be outlaws, who if caught, could be punished by death; 
however, these categories caused more heated contention, since the 
definition of partisan warfare was limited to the disturbance of an en-
emy’s communication system.36 Robbery or pillaging, even if it was 
sanctioned by the Confederacy, was punishable by death. The order 
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had the opposite of the desired effect. It aimed to decrease tension 
and limit irregular activity, but partisan warfare was employed to a 
greater extent following the provisions. Historian Daniel E. Suther-
land argues that as a result of this policy failure, “retaliation against 
local non-combatants and denying captured guerrillas their rights as 
prisoners of war became the most widely used means of restricting 
partisan operations.”37 As of 1863, the United States had begun to 
encourage the brutalization of civilians as a method for seeking re-
venge against guerrillas.
 As the Union policies towards guerrillas harshened, the at-
titudes of the Union army grew more hostile towards irregular fight-
ers in general. Daniel Robinson Hundley, a resident of Kentucky, 
articulated that the Yankee court had “guerrilla-on-the-brain” as a 
result of John Morgan’s raids and the activity of other partisans.38 
Hundley assessed, “Every man arrested within the limits of the State 
of Kentucky, be he soldier or citizen, was considered a guerrilla or 
bushwhacker.”39 He specifically recalled the execution of J.J. Nick-
ell, a Confederate soldier, who was an unfortunate “victim of Yankee 
tyranny.”40 Massachusetts’ politician and Union General, Benjamin 
Franklin Butler, held very strong negative sentiments towards guer-
rillas. He believed that guerrilla warfare should be punished with 
“the last severity,” and that rebels who murdered Union men should 
have their property burned.41 He argued that $1000 was the appropri-
ate reward for every “Guerilla head.”42 He justified this statement by 
articulating that the Union would bring the rebels “uncivilized sys-
tem of warfare to a sudden termination” by employing “an equally 
uncivilized remedy.”43 Similarly, General William Tecumseh Sher-
man found guerrilla groups to be equally “injurious” to both the Reb-
els and the Unionists.44 As the opinions of army officials towards 
generals worsened, the merciless punishment of guerrillas became 
commonplace.
 While the Union generals had always perceived the guer-
rillas negatively, Northern soldiers and civilians developed intense 
feelings of animosity towards guerrillas in the latter years of the 
war. Albert O’Connell Marshall, a soldier from New Lenox, Illinois, 
stated, “These guerrilla bands are thieves and murderers by occu-
pation, rebels by pretense, soldiers only in name, and cowards by 
nature. They terrorize over those they pretend to befriend.”45 Mar-
shall had formed his perception of guerrilla bands based on rumors 
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about guerrilla leader Timothy Reaves. Though Marshall had never 
met Reaves, he heard that he was “one of the meanest leaders of an 
irregular band” along the border of Missouri and Arkansas. Name-
calling was an easy way to dehumanize the guerrillas, making them 
easier to kill. Brigadier General Clinton B. Fisk, who was a Union 
commander in North Missouri, recalled an instance where a band of 
guerrillas was “yelling like demons.” The Union men then proceeded 
to swiftly kill “thirteen of the villains.”46 The tactic of euphemistic 
labeling helped the Union army to morally justify their actions.47
 On the other hand, there were Union soldiers who saw the 
humanity behind the actions of Confederate irregulars. Union soldier 
John E. Whipple recognized the compassion that the actions of guer-
rilla John Hunt Morgan illustrated. While Morgan burned bridges 
up in the Tennessee mountains on multiples occasions, he always 
informed “the trains on the road after he [had] burned the bridges 
which shows he is something of a man after all.”48 Though Morgan 
used drastic tactics to fight for the Confederacy, Whipple’s words 
elucidate that Morgan did show respect for the lives of innocent ci-
vilians. While the North perceived guerrillas to be ruthless killers, 
some of them did show mercy. 
 Because of the increasingly vicious actions that the Union 
army took against alleged guerrillas, irregulars considered violence 
to be the only way for them to defend their communities.49 Missouri 
guerrilla leader Clifton D. Holtzclaw wrote to the post-command-
er at Keytesville, Missouri, declaring his intentions to avenge any 
innocent Southern civilian who was harmed by Union troops. He 
emphasized that he did not wish to kill any Union soldiers or burn 
their homes, but he was “determined to kill two Union for every 
So[uthern] sympathizer” that the Union army killed.50 Many guer-
rillas, particularly leaders such as William Clarke Quantrill and Bill 
Anderson, believed that they were protecting their people, aveng-
ing their lost friends and family, and defending the Southern cause. 
Historian Michael Fellman observes, “the nasty means they usually 
employed were forced upon them, by a barbarian foe. Inside, they 
were pure.”51 The guerrillas genuinely moral disengaged from their 
actions, redefining murder as an act of justice. In the process, murder 
evolved into a necessary deed of retribution. In other words, it was 
the moral obligation of Confederate guerrillas to avenge the deaths 
of their loved ones.
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 In August of 1863, the nature of the war took on a condition 
of emotionless violence. On August 21st, Quantrill and 450 of his 
men stormed into Lawrence, Kansas, and they committed one of the 
largest atrocities of the Civil War. They murdered 150 men and boys 
in order to avenge all of the Missouri citizens who had been robbed 
or harmed by Kansans during the war. When the Civil War reached 
August of 1863, “a cycle of retaliation and counterretaliation had 
deadened human sympathies and heightened tolerance for death and 
rapine.”52 There had been so much violence that people had grown 
numb to cruelty, and the perpetrators on both the Union and the guer-
rilla sides no longer attempted to justify their actions.  Violence had 
become an accepted state of normalcy. On August 25th, Brigadier-
General Ewing issued Order No. 11, which forced all residents of the 
Kansas City area to vacate their homes and leave their possessions 
behind.53 Essentially, this order left the citizens both homeless and 
penniless.  
 The vengeful relations between the guerrillas and the Union 
men continued to escalate during the later months of 1863. Guerrilla 
leader Champ Ferguson invaded the home of Union sympathizer 
John B. Rodgers while he was out of the house. Ferguson and his 
band of guerrillas attacked Rodgers’ wife and his seventeen-year-old 
daughter, threatening them with guns and pistols. Then, they pro-
ceeded to force the women to take off their clothes, while a group 
of twenty to thirty men pillaged the home.54 Meanwhile, Union men 
vowed to avenge their families for the physical and emotional pain 
that the guerrillas had caused. Some Federals chose to become des-
ignated guerrilla hunters as a means of retaliation. Fielding Hurst, 
William B. Stoke, and George W. Kirk scoured after guerrillas 
throughout Tennessee and other border states. They employed tactics 
similar to those used by guerrillas, including stealing and burning 
Confederate homes. A woman from western Tennessee declared that 
Fielding Hurst had “visited almost every corner in the county, tak-
ing stock, plundering houses, burning and every other meanness you 
could imagine.”55 As of 1864, the tactics of the Union soldiers and 
the techniques of the Confederate guerrillas were nearly replicas of 
each other.
 As the duel between the Union army and the raiders intensi-
fied, guerrillas were portrayed scathingly in the Northern press. While 
throughout the war the press had depicted guerrillas negatively, the 
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number of cutting articles pertaining to guerrillas escalated in 1864. 
The Daily National Intelligencer from Washington, D.C. referred to 
guerrillas as “merciless bands of robbers and murderers,” who in-
flicted pain upon their own countrymen.56 The Liberator, a strongly 
liberal and abolitionist paper, stated that the guerrilla Sterling Price 
had been “seduced by bad ambition,” and that he had made himself 
the head of a “perjured crew” and “a leader among traitors.”57 Frank 
Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, which was published in New York 
City, featured an article about Champ Ferguson following his execu-
tion in 1865. The article referred to Ferguson as a “notorious guer-
rilla and murderer, whose deeds” had “stained the war record of the 
Southwestern States.”58 The representation of guerrillas in the press 
illustrates the gradual transition of the Union’s attitude toward guer-
rillas. As the war reached its conclusion, the Federals believed that 
the guerrillas deserved no sympathy.
 The relationship between the Union army and the Confeder-
ate guerrillas had grown to be mutually merciless. This shift towards 
total war caused the Confederate perceptions of guerrilla warfare to 
change. In 1864, exiled Confederate governor of Missouri, Thomas 
Reynolds, who was once a guerrilla supporter, denied help to both 
Quantrill and Sterling Price when they asked for his endorsement.59 
He recognized that guerrilla warfare had submerged the Confederacy 
under a state of anarchy, and the irregular fighting was endangering 
the survival of the Confederacy. During January of 1864, General 
Thomas Rosser of Virginia began to criticize publically all types 
of irregular warfare for its detrimental impact on both the standard 
of military warfare and the morale of Confederate civilians. He re-
ferred to the partisan rangers as “a band of thieves,” who partici-
pated in “stealing, plundering, and doing every manner of mischief 
and crime.”60 The majority of Confederate officers had initially sup-
ported the partisan system, but they recognized that it was harming 
both the people and the Confederate cause. A civilian from Tennes-
see declared, “The whole country is so demoralized we cannot tell 
what may happen.”61 The Confederacy was clearly losing not just 
manpower but hope. The guerrillas were desperately committing 
ruthless atrocities, and the drained Southern civilians had come to 
expect banditry and brutality.
 The repeal of the PRA on February 16, 1864 marked the 
Confederate government’s official condemnation of irregular war-
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fare; nevertheless, guerrillas continued to resist. A band of Tennessee 
guerrillas killed two Union scouts and gang-raped a woman in early 
June.62 However, since Mosby’s Rangers and McNeill’s Rangers re-
mained the only two official partisan groups, their impact on the war 
was dwindling. Quantrill was killed on June 6 after a month of bat-
tling a bullet wound, and Bloody Bill Anderson was killed in late 
October.63 This loss of leadership combined with the Confederacy’s 
condemnation of partisan activity diminished the influence of guer-
rilla warfare in the Border States. 
 Caught up in a coldblooded battle of retaliation, the guer-
rillas and the Union soldiers both sacrificed their ideologies for the 
sake of violence. The Union’s invasive policies stirred up revolution-
ary sentiments in the Confederacy, which inspired the guerrillas to 
fight relentlessly against the Union. Ultimately, the rise of guerrilla 
warfare created an atmosphere of violence and fear in the Confed-
eracy. Irregular activity transformed the war into an anarchic blood-
bath, which eventually hurt the Confederate cause. Their brutality 
motivated the Union to implement more stringent policies and use 
harsher strategies. In addition, the perpetual violence damaged the 
morale of the Confederate people and created cracks in the unity 
of the Confederacy. Overcome by their thirst for revenge, both the 
Union army and the Confederate guerrillas destroyed the lives of 
many innocent civilians. Ultimately, both groups were directly re-
sponsible for the widespread destruction of the Confederacy and the 
emergence of total war in the Border States.
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historiCal alternatives in the first World War:
German Conceptualization, Creation, and Loss of Its Central 
Europe
 Eric Grube, University of Virginia
Introduction: Friedrich Naumann’s Place in Historiography
 In 2008, historian Eric Weitz published in The American His-
torical Review an argument concerning the organization of different 
groups of peoples within European political states. He claimed that 
from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to the Treaty of Versailles in 
1919, there had been a marked shift in how political states received 
their legitimacy to rule. States had been based around multi-nation-
alism, where the imperial political entity derived its power from 
tradition and ruled over numerous cultures that defined themselves 
primarily not based on ethnicity but on other determining factors, 
such as religion. By 1919, however, political states were to be based 
on nationalized populations, where individual states corresponded to 
an ethnically uniform population. He argued that over the nineteenth 
century and into the First World War, nationalism became a powerful 
political force—whereby a people both identified primarily with its 
constructed national identity and viewed its state’s authority as being 
based on the population being homogenous. Ethnic minorities were 
seen as undermining the legitimacy of a self-determined state and 
were thus personifications of issues that needed to be resolved.1
 Weitz’s argument commendably sheds light on a belief 
central to understanding the twentieth century, but it does so at the 
expense of other historical possibilities. He focuses solely on what 
came to pass, while only briefly touching on the topic of historical 
alternatives. Such an approach begs the question: Were there alter-
natives to the historical processes described by Weitz that offered 
something different but were just not followed through due to con-
textualized contingencies?  
 Friedrich Naumann, a Christian-Socialist member of the 
German Reichstag during the First World War, argued for just that: 
he drafted a proposal of Germany’s plans for organizing Europe after 
an assumed victory, a proposal that offered an alternative to self-de-
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termined states based on nationalized populations. Naumann wrote 
this proposal, entitled Mitteleuropa (or Central Europe), in 1915, a 
year after the war began.2 In this piece, he argued for the unification 
of the main Central Powers—the German Empire and the Empire 
of Austria-Hungary—after the conclusion of the war. He articulated 
the purpose of this action: to realize Central Europe’s potential as 
a powerhouse able to compete with Russia, Great Britain, and the 
United States.3 Naumann also articulated how he wanted this goal 
to be achieved. Namely, he wanted to use as models the previous 
German Customs Unions, which established joint economic poli-
cies, and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. This dual mon-
archy system had been established with the Ausgleich of 1867 and 
was organized such that Austria and Hungary had separate domestic 
policies but were united in terms of foreign policy. Thus, Naumann 
essentially hoped for a Central European confederation that would 
maintain the Hohenzollern Kaiser of Germany and the Habsburg 
Emperor of Austria-Hungary as rulers of their own domestic realms. 
He also hoped this new entity would have joint commissions to set 
external economic and diplomatic policy.4 It was to be the taking of 
the German-Austrian-Hungarian Alliance to the next level of coop-
eration.  
 What this political plan implied was exactly what made it a 
historical alternative to Weitz’s conclusion concerning an obsession 
with nationally uniform states: Naumann was proposing a political 
entity that would be even more ethnically diverse than the already 
multinational Habsburg Empire, the fragmentation of which due to 
rising centrifugal national forces had initiated the war in the first 
place. This combined political entity was to be a demographic brew 
of nationalities—Germans, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, 
Hungarians, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians—and religious 
confessions—Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox Christians, and Jews. 
This plan meant to incorporate people with different identities in 
a manner reminiscent of the earlier system of states ruling ethni-
cally heterogeneous populations in multinational conglomerations. 
Naumann anticipated and reacted to counter-arguments to his plan—
namely, problems concerning this confederation’s ability to main-
tain its power over such a diverse population—by claiming that he 
wanted this confederation in Central Europe to transcend the issue 
of nationality. He hoped the creation of his Central Europe, which 
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was to be a new nexus of world power, would maximize the potential 
of all the included nationalities and thus lead to the disappearance 
of conflicts concerning nationalities needing their own states. Nau-
mann unequivocally rejected the idea of national self-determination 
on the grounds that in Central Europe, divided self-determined states 
could not compete in the world.5 He claimed that “The parliamentary 
system which is a product of the democratic age has become unus-
able because it is handicapped by nationalism, the second result of 
democracy,” and thus he hoped to bolster the support for his multina-
tional super-state whose power would create a transcendence of the 
question and problem of national differences.6
 What Naumann hoped was that the war—which he saw as 
an immense test, the culmination of diplomatic competition—would 
be the sparking event for creating his confederation; the war would 
prove how well Germany and Austria-Hungary worked together 
and would also demonstrate the absolute necessity of consolidating 
their power in such a pugnacious diplomatic arena. The First World 
War was to be, for Naumann, the impetus and justification for creat-
ing his Central Europe, and he expressed his sentiments when he 
stated, “We all wish to begin anew,” a use of rhetoric reminiscent 
of Paine’s desires for a fresh start for civilization in America.7 But, 
in the context of the Eastern Front, where Germany would occupy, 
administer, and briefly acquire territories of Central Europe, what 
the Germans would find was not a melting pot, but rather, a crucible 
of war. By 1918, this crucible resulted in a Russian desire for peace, 
subsequently leading to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the 
Central Powers and Bolshevik Russia. The German demands at this 
peace conference in what is today Belarus gave Germany the oppor-
tunity to carryout Naumann’s plan: Germany essentially dictated a 
short-lived political layout of eastern Central Europe. However, the 
final treaty was by no means a transcription of Naumann’s ideas, but 
rather, a document shaped by numerous other historical processes, 
as will be discussed. To what extent was Naumann’s plan, which of-
fered an alternative to the self-determination model for which Weitz 
argues, manifested in and yet also contradicted by this treaty? Ques-
tions such as this yield important conclusions concerning just how 
Germany’s plan for eastern Central Europe came to be, and how 
it created, albeit briefly, an alternative to the idea of national self-
determination.
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War in the East: Organization and Policies of Occupation
 In order to understand the terms of Brest-Litovsk, the Ger-
man army’s policies on the Eastern Front must first be examined—
not only as a case study of human rights violations but also to see 
how a dissonance began to grow between Naumann’s theoretical 
ideas and actual German actions in eastern Central Europe.  
 Western constructions and perceptions of the East very much 
shaped how the First World War played out, as evident by the strate-
gies the German High Command had created for dealing with a two 
front war. As the European powers mobilized in 1914, the Germans 
put into motion their decisive blow against France. The German 
High Command thought Russia was too backward to mobilize itself 
promptly but also too vast to be conquered swiftly. Removing France 
from the war first would let Germany then focus all of its forces on 
Russia and achieve an overall victory on both fronts. However, the 
advance of the German war machine in the West was halted because 
of the German decision to invade France by violating Belgium’s neu-
trality, a gamble that brought Great Britain into the conflict against 
Germany. The German objective of Paris, upon which the German 
High Command had placed all their hope of victory, was out of 
reach. The Western Front stalled into the trench stalemate already 
studied extensively in historiography. Germany’s fear—a protracted 
two-front war—had become a reality.
 To make matters worse for the German High Command, 
the Russian forces mobilized much faster than had been calculated. 
The feared swarms of Russian troops began their advance into east-
ern Germany while the bulk of the German army was not advanc-
ing in the Western Front. However, Germany had two advantages 
that led to its victory at Tannenberg in August of 1914: the presence 
of Germany’s great (and brutal) military tacticians, Ludendorff and 
Hindenburg, on the Eastern Front and grave blunders on the part of 
Russia’s military command. The Battle of Tannenberg and, shortly 
thereafter, the Battle of the Masurian Lakes effectively ended the 
Russian push into Germany and led to the German advance into Rus-
sian territory.8
 The unexpected success of the German Eastern Front in the 
first few months of the war is critical to understanding the story of 
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The two giants of the Eastern Front, Lu-
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dendorff and Hindenburg, had achieved tangible successes, which 
continued to evade the High Command in the West. These clear-cut 
German triumphs in a time of growing frustration in the West un-
equivocally made these German commanders war heroes at home. 
Their basis for support from the German masses was solidified, and 
this domestic backing led to a historical process central to the war’s 
outcome: these commanders would be able to aggrandize their own 
influence in politics over the course of the war without much com-
plaint from the civilian population.9
 By 1915, Germany had gained control over what had been 
Russian Poland, the Russian Baltic regions of today’s Latvia and 
Lithuania, and much of what is today’s Belarus. This advance was 
when human rights violations first emerged, ironically, by the Rus-
sians. The Russian troops, carrying out a scorched-earth retreat, shot 
or forcibly moved eastward many of their own peoples who lived in 
rural settings, all because of the fear that these peoples could become 
collaborators with the invading Germans. A disproportionate number 
of Jews were forced out, as their language, Yiddish, was more linked 
to German than the Slavic languages were, and thus they were more 
likely to be accused of collaboration.10 
 In August of 1915, the German advance continued, and, to 
Ludendorff’s chagrin, what had been Poland was to be administered 
by the German civilian government’s bureaucrats under the name of 
the Government General of Warsaw. Ludendorff then became deter-
mined not to lose custody of the Baltic regions, and he was in fact 
successful in this endeavor. This region received the name Oberbe-
fehlshaber Ost—meaning Supreme Command of the East—or Ober 
Ost for short. The city of Kowno became the main site of the Ger-
man military’s occupation apparatus, and Ober Ost was kept under 
military control for the duration of the war. And in terms of human 
rights, this region saw the gender-specific violations that unfortu-
nately seem to be the rule rather than the exception in modern war-
fare. Local men were beaten while women were raped, crimes which 
the German High Command failed to address.11 
 In November of 1915, the German Chancellor, Bethmann 
Hollweg, convened separate meetings to discuss Germany’s policies 
toward both its allies and its enemies. Naumann was asked to attend 
despite being just a regular member of the Reichstag. However, his 
role in this process was that of an observer; rather than being molded 
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actively by him, the policies were simply reported to him after the 
deliberations had taken place.12 The high authorities’ decision to mar-
ginalize Naumann in these initial meetings might seem benign, but it 
was truly indicative of what was to pan out on the Eastern front. At 
this moment in the war, numerous disconnects between Naumann’s 
theories, still being finalized into its published form, and German 
policies began to emerge.
 Naumann argued for two main things: an economic and po-
litical union of Central Europe that was mutually beneficial to all of 
its inhabitants and a powerful super-confederation that transcended 
the divisionary nature of nationalism and national identity.13 Real-
ity, however, was much different. Germany’s three main principles 
of occupation in Ober Ost, as will be explained, were “‘Order of 
Rule,’” Verkehrspolitik (literally, “transport politics”), and the spread 
of German culture, or Kultur, by means of the educational institu-
tions. All three of these policies ran counter to Naumann’s two cen-
tral tenets. Under Order of Rule, German military needs took priority 
over any local or civilian needs, thus contradicting Naumann’s first 
tenet. With Verkehrspolitik, or movement policy, the German occupi-
ers committed abuses that led to a process of solidification of the oc-
cupied peoples’ national identities, a growing national consciousness 
that directly contradicted Naumann’s second tenet. The implementa-
tion of German education policy in the schools of Ober Ost further 
crystallized the national identities of the occupied peoples, and thus, 
the Kultur policies also led to the opposite of Naumann’s second 
tenet.14
 Order of Rule manifested itself mainly in the German ex-
ploitation of the agricultural and other natural resources of Ober 
Ost. Nature itself, the physical essence of a nation, was violated on 
a mass scale, with horrendous consequences for the local inhabit-
ants. Because the German war machine required large amounts of 
foodstuffs, and because the Allied blockade halted the import of food 
from around the world, eastern Central Europe’s fields and granaries 
were exploited immensely. The local peoples were robbed of their 
livestock—especially horses, vital as they were for transporting war 
supplies—and locals who refused were sometimes shot on the spot. 
Tickets were administered to people whose property had been taken 
so they could be reimbursed after the war, but the backing of those 
reimbursements depended on a German victory. The total monetary 
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value of the goods taken from Ober Ost came to about 338,606,000 
marks.15 Clearly and unsurprisingly, the practical and logistical 
needs of the war trumped the Reichstag’s rhetoric of maximizing 
all nationalities’ potentials, but what is surprising is the extent to 
which the German policy worked against itself. The requisition of 
livestock and the abuse of locals that drove them into smuggling or 
stealing actually significantly crippled the agricultural productivity 
of the area. The destructiveness of Germany’s Order of Rule thus 
sometimes trumped its own best interest.16
 German Verkehrspolitik (“transport politics”) focused on 
the movement of peoples. This policy had two main facets. The first 
blended with Order of Rule and centered on extracting men from 
their local towns and forcing them into labor brigades, which were 
then shuffled around Ober Ost to wherever labor for the German 
war effort was needed. In total, about 60,000 Lithuanian men were 
forced into labor companies, many of whom were grabbed by Ger-
man soldiers waiting for them to come out of churches. Malnutrition, 
overwork, and disease were a deadly triad, and many laborers never 
returned home. Although this policy of labor units was officially 
done away with in September 1917, the use of forced and exploited 
labor continued up until the end of the war.17 The second facet of 
Verkehrspolitik was about restricting the movement of the rest of the 
civilian populations by means of identification cards. Inhabitants of 
Ober Ost ten and older were required, adding insult to injury, to buy 
an individualized identity card, complete with fingerprints. A total of 
1,800,000 were issued, and they were to be presented anytime a Ger-
man occupier requested to see them. These cards made it difficult to 
travel, as the Germans did not like people leaving the locality printed 
on their card.18
 Ironically, Order Rule and this shuffling of laborers around, 
causing detrimental economic consequences, made it such that the 
national identities of the people affected actually became more solid-
ified. The inhabitants of Ober Ost began to relate with other people 
who had been similarly abused and realized what they had in com-
mon as opposed to the abusive Germans. The locals depended on 
each other more and more for help, strengthening the national identi-
ties of the occupied regions. Thus, the German war policies in the 
East, specifically in Ober Ost, led to a strengthened sense of national 
awareness amongst the occupied people, directly counteracting Nau-
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mann’s goal of a Central Europe that transcended the question of 
nationality.19
 The education policies contained within the German plan 
for establishing German Kultur in Ober Ost also hardened the re-
solve of local people to identify with their nationality because of two 
important aspects. First, the Germans hoped to eliminate all traces 
of Russian influences from the schools. Thus, the Germans allowed 
for the instruction of most subjects to be conducted in the local lan-
guages of the inhabitants, as opposed to the traditional Russian that 
had been used. This helped lead to the standardization of local lan-
guages, such as Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish, as more uniform 
styles of these languages were used to instruct school children. Thus, 
the educational policy linked the identity of the locals with their na-
tive languages, further fanning the intensity of nationality in this 
region, all against Naumann’s hopes. The second aspect of the Ger-
man educational policy was that Ober Ost unsurprisingly deemed 
the German language a necessary subject. This mandatory teaching 
of German grammar and vocabulary, however, led to a spiteful back-
lash against German culture, as the locals resented the fact that they 
had to learn German. Thus, Ober Ost contradicted Naumann’s pro-
posal because it attempted to establish German cultural dominance 
and consequently, although inadvertently, increased the tendency of 
local inhabitants to identify with their own culture and nationality.20
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Germany Organizes Eastern Cen-
tral Europe
 By 1917, the Russian ability to make war was broken while 
the Tsarist regime toppled under the pressure. A revolution in March 
introduced a parliamentary government headed by Kerensky, but this 
government’s unwillingness to make peace with the Central Powers 
reduced its own base of support. The Germans aided Lenin’s return 
to Russia in order to spark another revolution that would weaken 
Russia further and force a conclusion of the Eastern Front. The 
Bolsheviks seized power, and on November 8, 1917, declared their 
desire for peace. The delegates of the belligerent powers—notably 
Trotsky from Russia and, after the armistice of December 15, Kühl-
mann from Germany—met in the town of Brest-Litovsk in German-
occupied Russia.21 The temporary dividing line created by the armi-
stice, according the Third Article of the Armistace document, was 
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the front line of the war itself—from the Gulf of Riga to the border 
of Austria-Hungary.22
 However, a noticeable shift in the German rhetoric had oc-
curred, and that led to serious resentments on the part of the Rus-
sians. Initially, the German claims about its war goals had been 
strictly, even if only superficially, non-expansionist in the East. This 
more modest rhetoric was evident in Naumann’s emphasis on a po-
litical realignment of the Central Powers as they were, in such a way 
that did not emphasize the German desire to annex lands. Indeed, he 
even stated, “It is difficult to believe that Prussia will alter her eastern 
frontier very much unless she is compelled to do so.”23 Furthermore, 
Naumann claimed that it was not necessary for Russian Poland to 
be included in Central Europe as he envisioned it, given that it was 
unknowable in 1915 where the line between German and Russian 
forces would crystallize.24 Even as late as July 1917, the Reichstag 
re-emphasized the non-aggrandizing war aims of Germany in its 
“Peace Resolution.”25
 However, upon the discussion of a peace treaty in December, 
the German terms had shifted to be very annexationist—indicating 
the extent to which the duration of the war had drained Germany 
and thus pressured the German diplomats for stricter peace terms. 
More insidiously, these harsher terms revealed the extent to which 
the German High Command had stolen political power from Kaiser 
Wilhelm II and extended this political power into the legislature’s 
jurisdiction. The intensification of the war effort provided the pretext 
and the cover for this transfer of political power to the German High 
Command, marked most notably by the decision to make the ever-
popular Hindenburg and Ludendorff in charge of the entire German 
war effort on August 29, 1916. The goals of the German High Com-
mand, having gained more and more political power, were of course 
centered on annexing territory that it had been administering. This 
shift in the German demands also led to protracted negotiations with 
the Bolsheviks, including numerous hiatuses, but ultimately the Bol-
sheviks had no choice but to accept German annexationist desires, as 
they were under threat of a renewed German offensive. On March 3, 
1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was officially finalized and estab-
lished peace between the Central Powers and Russia.26
 The Third Article of this treaty is critical in two respects. 
First, it set in diplomatic writing Russia’s losses. Russia officially 
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had to abandon its claims to any land west of the negotiated line, 
which was actually significantly deeper into Russian territory than 
the armistice line had been.27 Second, the Third Article clearly stated, 
“Germany and Austria-Hungary purpose to determine the future sta-
tus of these territories in agreement with their population.”28 How-
ever, there was no doubt that these regions were to be incorporated 
into a bloated Germany, as the German High Command wanted a 
prize that could be useful in any future wars, which it was already 
anticipating. The High Command hoped to use the argument of self-
determination, as articulated in the final treaty, to justify any annexa-
tions.29 The High Command claimed that the populations of these 
regions were, in fact, German. Thus, the German High Command 
hoped to use the ethnic Germans already inhabiting these territories 
to claim these lands for Germany in the name of self-determination, 
which was to be their rationalization for their ravenously annex-
ationist peace.30
 Thus, the German High Command paradoxically adopted 
the rhetoric of its enemy, Wilson’s United States, but perverted it to 
fit their annexationist desires and cover up what was clearly a case of 
conquest. By directly appealing to popular self-determination based 
on nations, albeit with a pre-set German result, the German High 
Command directly contradicted Naumann’s rejection of nationalized 
self-determination and his hope for the transcendence of the question 
of nationality. However, the German High Command’s designs were 
also reconciled with Naumann’s text. On a broader level, Naumann’s 
Central Europe had already created a framework for thinking of 
maximizing the power of Central Europe, as evident by his claims 
for creating a political entity in Central Europe that could compete 
with Russia, Great Britain, and the United States.31 But now, the 
German High Command inserted Wilsonian rhetoric in order to take 
Naumann’s plan—the creation of a large state in Central Europe—
and manipulate it to fit their expansionist desires. Thus, Naumann’s 
proposal was manifested in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as a mindset 
that set the terms of creating a super-state in Central Europe, but it 
was contradicted by the fact that the use of self-determination in 
the treaty underscored the importance of nationality and was used to 
justify the German domination of other nationalities. In the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk, self-determination, the foil to Naumann’s ideas, was 
ironically infused into Naumann’s broader objectives.
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 In order to justify the German-dominated Central Europe 
with the rhetoric of national self-determination, the state structure of 
Ober Ost created petitions, which the inhabitants of Ober Ost were 
to sign if they wanted to be a part of Germany. Since the vast major-
ity did not want that fate, Ober Ost was left in an awkward position 
where its attempt to justify annexation was proving to be an argu-
ment against it. Undeterred, the German High Command had the 
state agents of Ober Ost force the local inhabitants to sign these doc-
uments. The methods ranged from the use of intimidation to making 
signatures the price for needed foodstuffs, all for the purpose of cre-
ating a falsified argument for national self-determination.32 However 
unilateral Germany’s acquisition of Ober Ost had been, the German 
occupation regime went through cumbersome travails to acquire a 
Wilsonian rationalization for its expansionism. Unfortunately for 
Naumann’s hopes, both this rationalization and this German expan-
sionism were in conflict with his original proposal.
Responses to Brest-Litovsk: Naumann, the Signing Powers, Ober 
Ost, and the Western Allies
 As the terms for Brest-Litovsk were being solidified, Nau-
mann and numerous other politicians expressed their desires—they 
prioritized the ultimate goal of a Central Europe above any annexa-
tions pushed for by the High Command.33 Later, in August of 1918, 
Naumann himself articulated his thoughts on Germany’s diplomatic 
exploits. He claimed that, for better or for worse, the Treaty had deter-
mined exactly where the eastern border of his desired Central Europe 
was to be. He specifically commented on how the question he left 
open in his 1915 document concerning Poland had been answered 
by military force, as he stated in his 1918 response, “Since the treaty 
of Brest-Litovsk it is no longer a question whether Poland shall lie to 
the east or west of the border. The die is cast, Poland remains Middle 
European.”34 More importantly, Naumann expressed exactly what he 
thought needed to happen as a result of the conclusion of peace on 
the Eastern Front—namely, the time for creating his Central Europe, 
the joining of the Central Powers into an economic and diplomatic 
conglomeration, needed to happen immediately.35 The sense of ur-
gency found throughout Naumann’s response indicates the amount 
of stress being felt from the Western Front—he seemed to know that 
the claims from the East needed to be solidified as the war dragged 
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on with the Western Allies. 
 Further evidence of the gravity of the situation on the West-
ern Front was apparent in the German High Command’s response to 
the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk just months after its final-
ization. On August 27, 1918, two addendum treaties were attached 
to the end of the original document. The first was a general modifi-
cation of certain articles of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, both clari-
fying old and attaching new agreements.36 Most interesting is the 
Third Article of this first addendum, which claimed Germany was 
to abandon some of its land taken from Russia in exchange for fi-
nancial reimbursement from Russia. By extension, this Article also 
established the principle that Germany could abandon any territory 
it wished in exchange for Russian financial resources.37 Essentially, 
Germany was so strapped for cash as the Western Front caved in that 
the High Command was willing to sell back to the Russians some of 
its acquisitions from the East. Clearly, the situation was critical if the 
annexationist German High Command was willing to sacrifice parts 
of its prize for currency. And here is where another historical irony 
was made apparent. The context of the war was no longer the deliv-
ery room for Naumann’s Central Europe, but rather, it had become 
the alter upon which his idea was being sacrificed.
 The second addendum treaty to Brest-Litovsk was strictly a 
financial agreement, which again revealed the desperation of Germa-
ny by August of 1918.38 The Ninth Article of the original treaty had 
specified no indemnities were to be paid by either signing party.39 
Five months later, however, the Germans demanded in the Second 
Article of the financial addendum that “Russia shall pay Germany 
a sum of 6,000,000,000 marks as compensation for the loss to Ger-
mans caused by Russian measures…”40 Clearly, the circumstances of 
the war had shifted since the time of the original document: Germany 
had such a need to pay for the worsening situation on the Western 
Front that it edited the original Treaty with Russia to make up for the 
German High Command’s previous miscalculation.
 All of this German back-peddling to impose harsher terms 
in addition to the already ravenous territorial claims in the original 
treaty culminated in another unexpected development with impor-
tant implications for Naumann’s dream. Ironically, the victory of 
the Central Powers in the East (and the attaining of an opportune 
moment to realize Naumann’s blueprint) ended up driving a wedge 
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between Germany and Austria-Hungary diplomatically. All of the 
territorially and financially ravenous terms forced upon the Russians 
made Austria-Hungary feel like it was now waging a war it could no 
longer afford just to secure Germany’s annexations.41 The drawing 
up of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had been, in theory, the moment 
when the Central Powers could have dictated the organization of 
Central Europe in a way that realized Naumann’s vision. However, 
the German High Command chose not to, favoring instead a strategy 
that brewed mistrust between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Thus, 
the results of Brest-Litovsk led to the exact opposite of what Nau-
mann had originally planned.
 Furthermore, the overambitious appetite of the German 
High Command on the Eastern Front contributed to the collapse of 
its Western Front. The German military’s final drive for Paris, the 
1918 Michael Offensive, disintegrated in the face of the Western Al-
lies, now bolstered by the United States. Meanwhile, one million 
German troops remained idle in the occupation and administration 
of Germany’s newly acquired lands in the East.42 Two important 
historical processes explain the German decision to keep so much 
manpower fallow in the East. Ludendorff feared Bolshevik propa-
ganda had too heavily influenced the Eastern troops. Therefore, he 
concluded it would be too dangerous to move them to Western Front, 
where it was feared morale was faltering. Also, the High Command 
believed that number of soldiers was needed to maintain order in the 
vast new territories for which it was now responsible. Ludendorff did 
realize his mistake and decided to double back on his miscalculation. 
Over the summer and fall of 1918, he moved around half a million 
troops to the West—but the momentum from the start of the spring 
offensive had already been lost.43 While the failure on the Western 
Front eventually cost Germany its prize in the East, the prize from 
the East interestingly took away from Germany any chance of a more 
favorable bargaining position in the West.
 The Lithuanian political elite in Ober Ost had their own re-
sponse to the peace making between the Central Powers and Russia. 
As the Russian forces collapsed in late 1917, intellectual leaders in 
Lithuania met in Vilnius to establish the Taryba, an executive com-
mittee to speak on behalf of Lithuania. The Taryba tried to play dif-
ferent factions within the German government off of each other in an 
effort to gain legitimacy. It appealed to the more liberal civilian gov-
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ernment of the Reichstag against the increasingly powerful German 
High Command that had essentially supplanted the Kaiser. The Ta-
ryba found the Catholic Zentrum party to be particularly responsive. 
Its leader, Matthias Erzberger, continuously spoke for the legitimacy 
of the Taryba as the true voice of the territory of Ober Ost, or rather, 
of Lithuania. The Taryba’s boldness grew such that it declared Lithu-
ania to be an independent state on February 16, 1918, just two weeks 
before the finalization of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Now, to be 
sure, the German High Command’s desire to have Lithuania trumped 
any declaration the Taryba made.44 However, this increasing bold-
ness further illuminated just how German policies led to the solidi-
fication of the idea of states based on nationality in eastern Central 
Europe—the exact antithesis of what Naumann had had in mind.
 The responses of the Western Allies to the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk further revealed the historical significance of the German 
High Command manipulating ideas of self-determination to support 
its own annexations. Upon discovering the German perversion of his 
own ideals, Wilson realized that Germany truly intended to treat this 
war as an annexationist war. The precedent Germany set in the East 
confirmed a fear among the Allied powers that the German military-
controlled government had similar intentions in the West, and thus 
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk led to a radicalization of the war aims 
of the United States. Wilson was no longer willing to appeal to any 
German liberal sentiments to establish a compromising peace based 
solely on his Fourteen Points, a peace that would not have included 
such a vindictive punishment for Germany and could have included 
Germany in the post-war order. In the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, how-
ever, Germany proved to Wilson that it truly was a military state that 
needed to be defeated.  Wilson now accepted that unilateral peace 
terms, which would restructure the political organization of Central 
Europe according to the Allies’ desires, had to be forced on Ger-
many.45 Thus, in another historical irony, while Brest-Litovsk had 
been Germany’s opportunity to construct its Central Europe, it ended 
up being the Allied impetus for dictating the postwar organization of 
Central Europe. And this Allied-imposed organization was to em-
body national self-determination—the intellectual foil to Naumann’s 
ideas presented in Central Europe.  
 Consequently, both the Central Powers and the Allies re-
sponded to Brest-Litovsk in ways that conflicted with Naumann’s 
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proposal—the treaty drove a diplomatic wedge between Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, while it simultaneously gave the Allies cause 
to make sure their terms of self-determination for Central European 
nationalities were implemented in the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.46 If 
Naumann expected the war to be the forge used to create his Central 
Europe, it ended up being the kiln in which his plans were consumed. 
The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Germany’s moment to make real the 
idea of Central Europe, had become the petrol that turned the Allied 
flame into an inferno.
Concluding Reflections
 Naumann, writing his proposal when the war had been go-
ing well for Germany on the East, had hoped to construct a political 
entity based on principles that ran counter to the trend of his times; 
he directly opposed the concept of political self-determination for 
nationalities. Instead, he hoped to reuse an older concept of multi-
ethnic political entities, such as that used by the crumbling Dual 
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, the very crumbling of which resulted 
from this rising national consciousness that had initiated the war.47 
However, the German policies in their occupation of eastern Central 
Europe showed the ease with which national consciousness arose 
in Ober Ost.48 Also, the German diplomatic policy at Brest-Litovsk 
revealed how a perverse fusion of both Naumann’s ideas of a super-
state in Central Europe and Wilson’s ideas of self-determination led 
to the justification for an annexationist peace. Furthermore, as has 
been argued in this paper, the Treaty itself ended up creating reac-
tions from both within and without the two main Central Powers that 
made Naumann’s goal of Central Europe even less of a reality.
 Historian Fritz Fischer claims, “Friedrich Naumann’s book, 
Mitteleuropa, which caused such a sensation at the time, appears 
merely as a remarkable, but yet thoroughly unrealistic, flight of fan-
tasy.” Is this to say Naumann’s text is not useful in understanding the 
past? On the contrary, even Fischer concedes such a text helps reveal 
the mentalité of German policy makers when he claims it elicited tre-
mendous amounts of responses and debates.49 Thus, an investigation 
of this source shows the conceptual contingencies discussed during 
the First World War and helps construct an understanding of how 
people in this historical context thought of their world. Furthermore, 
what makes Naumann’s text historiographically significant is that 
87
et al.: JBHR, Vol. 5
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2014
88 Spring 2014JameS Blair HiStorical review
it reveals what seems natural to us—the belief that political states 
should be based on nationally uniform populations—was originally 
just one historical possibility, a single option among many. Thus, this 
assumption concerning states and populations was neither a histori-
cal inevitability nor the result of some linear historical trajectory.
 To be sure, Weitz’s theory that the twentieth century saw a 
marked obsession with uniform populations within political states is 
based in historical reality, but a broader and more complete historical 
understanding can be acquired when intellectual alternatives are also 
examined.50 This is exactly what Naumann’s text has to offer—an 
idealized conceptualization of political unity that was supposed to 
transcend questions of national heterogeneity as all peoples within 
the state reached their maximum potentials.51 Furthermore, many as-
pects of Naumann’s intellectual creation would later manifest them-
selves in Europe. It just took an even more destructive World War to 
provide a sufficient enough impetus for forming, by way of coopera-
tive economic policies, a multinational confederation in Europe.
 Thus, Weitz’s theory does create a basic model for thinking 
of historical processes from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries. 
However, it falls short in terms of studying contingencies—alterna-
tives in history that did not last but still help create an understanding 
of the past. It also does not account for the development of post-
World War II confederations composed of numerous European na-
tionalities and marked by shared political and economic institutions. 
Naumann’s Central Europe could provide useful insights into these 
historical concepts and more recent processes, and consequently, this 
text should be the topic of future historical study.
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